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Statelessness and Mass Expulsion in Sudan: A 
Reassessment of the International Law 
Mike Sanderson∗ 
I.   INTRODUCTION: “RENATIONALIZATION” AND THE RESULTING THREATS OF MASS 
EXPULSION AND STATELESSNESS 
¶1  Following the secession of South Sudan1 from Sudan on July 9, 2011, both South 
Sudan and Sudan have passed new citizenship laws with dramatic effects for the rights of 
individuals on both sides of the new border. While in Sudan this consists of a series of 
amendments to the 1994 Sudanese Nationality Act,2 the new South Sudan government 
has promulgated an entirely new Nationality Act.3 I have recently published an extended 
analysis of the resulting legal regime that describes its key features in some detail.4 This 
paper builds on that initial analysis through an examination of the key resulting 
protection threats for those South Sudanese remaining in Sudan and, in particular, 
resulting de jure and de facto statelessness and the threat of mass expulsion. As such, this 
article is intended to serve as something of a companion piece to my earlier paper. While 
that paper examined the operation of the post-secession nationality regime in detail, this 
article explains the resources available at public international law to address the key 
failures of that regime.  
¶2  I begin in Section 2 of this paper with a discussion of denationalization following 
state succession with particular reference to the case of Sudan and South Sudan. Put 
broadly, individuals with ethnic and familial affinities to South Sudan acquire the 
citizenship of South Sudan5 ex lege while, in parallel, the Sudanese law operates to 
denationalize individuals who acquire (“de jure or de facto”) the citizenship of South 
Sudan.6 The combined effect of both laws is to “renationalize” individuals with ethnic 
and familial affinities with South Sudan to South Sudanese nationality. It is not 
uncommon to denationalize someone following his or her voluntary acquisition or 
                                                        
s LLB (SOAS), BCL, MPhil (Oxon.), MSc (LSHTM), Barrister (England and Wales), Lecturer, School of 
Law, University of Exeter (m.a.sanderson@exeter.ac.uk).  I have previously served as legal consultant to 
UNHCR Sudan.  The present paper is written in my personal capacity and does not necessarily reflect the 
views of UNHCR.   
1
 The Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan will be referred to as Sudan and South Sudan, 
respectively, throughout this paper.  When Sudanese is used alone (to refer to either the expressions of the 
state or its citizens) this will always refer to the Republic of Sudan. Similarly, South Sudanese will always 
refer to the Republic of South Sudan.   
2
 Sudanese Nationality Act (1994) (Sudan). 
3
 The Nationality Act (2011) (S. Sudan). 
4
 Mike Sanderson, The Post-Secession Nationality Regimes in Sudan and South Sudan, 27 J. OF 
IMMIGRATION, NATIONALITY AND ASYLUM L. 204 (2013). 
5
 The Nationality Act, supra note 3, art. 8.  
6
 Sudanese Nationality Act, supra, note 2, art. 10(2). 
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retention of a foreign nationality.7 However, it is very unusual to denationalize someone 
following his or her involuntary acquisition of a foreign nationality.8 There is, 
nevertheless, significant state practice in support of this policy in the particular context of 
state succession.9 
¶3  Where control over territory passes to a new sovereign and individuals would 
otherwise be left either uncertain as to their nationality or without the nationality of their 
(new) state, it makes good administrative sense to introduce a process by which 
nationality is clearly and quickly allocated among the succeeding states. In these 
circumstances, citizenship is typically allocated in accordance with the state of “habitual 
residence.” This serves to efficiently reconcile the citizenship of the individual to the 
state of their actual residence. In doing so, it preserves an “effective link” between the 
individual and their state and facilitates good national protection. 
¶4  However, and at variance with common international practice, the citizenship of 
South Sudan is determined on the basis of a complex of ethnic and familial affinities10 
unrelated to actual residence in the territory of South Sudan. As a result, and despite the 
process of renationalization as implemented by this new regime, there is no necessary or 
resulting correlation between South Sudanese citizenship and actual residence in South 
Sudan. A significant class of individuals habitually resident in Sudan, but with ethnic or 
familial connections with the South, will acquire the citizenship of South Sudan rather 
than their country of actual residence (i.e., Sudan). This class is, in effect, “displaced” by 
operation of law as they are now outside their country of citizenship. Individuals left 
outside their country of nationality by operation of the new citizenship regime are left in 
a position of extreme vulnerability at risk of both de jure and de facto statelessness and 
arbitrary and/or mass expulsion. I identify these as the key legal protection threats for 
South Sudanese nationals in Sudan.  
¶5  In section 3 I discuss the causes of de jure and de facto statelessness in the 
Sudanese and South Sudanese nationality regimes in greater detail. Individuals 
denationalized on the basis of a prima facie affinity to the class of South Sudanese 
citizens (as defined in the new South Sudanese law) may struggle to establish any 
                                                        
7
 Special Rapporteur on the Expulsion of Aliens, Fourth Rep. on the Expulsion of Aliens, Int’l Law 
Comm’n, ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/594 (Mar. 24, 2008) (by Maurice Kamto).  
8
 Id.; see also BRONWEN MANBY, CITIZENSHIP LAW IN AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 84 (2010), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/women/docs/OtherEntities/OSJI%20CitizenshipAfricaStudy.pdf. 
Kamto suggests a useful distinction between “loss of nationality” (“the consequence of an individual’s 
voluntary act”) and “denationalization” (“a State decision of a collective or individual nature”).  While I 
have not chosen to adopt Kamto’s usage and use these terms synonymously throughout this paper, Kamto’s 
usage of these terms points to legally significant distinctions not immediately evident in the more common 
and homogenous use of these terms. 
9
 Special Rapporteur on Nationality, Including Statelessness, Rep. on Nationality, Including Statelessness, 
Int’l L. Comm’n 3, 10, 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/50/1952 (1952) (by Manley O. Hudson) (Germany 
undertakes to recognize any new nationality which has been or may be acquired by her nationals under the 
laws of the Allied and Associated Powers and in accordance with the decisions of the competent authorities 
of these Powers pursuant to naturalisation laws or under treaty stipulations, and “to regard such persons as 
having, in consequence of the acquisition of such new nationality, in all respects severed their allegiance to 
their country of origin.”) (quoting Treaty of Versailles, art. 278, June 28, 1919).  Paul Weis refers to the 
process of the “automatic loss of nationality upon acquisition of another nationality . . . by operation of 
law” as “substitution.” PAUL WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 116 
(Sijthoff et al. eds., 2d ed. 1979).    
10
 Sanderson supra note 4 at 209-216.  
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subsequent claim to South Sudanese citizenship and so be left as de jure stateless. Both 
laws operate ex lege and in advance of any formal determination by the state. The 
operation of the Sudanese denationalization provisions is, according to the terms of the 
Sudanese law, contingent on prior acquisition of South Sudanese citizenship. 
Denationalization from Sudanese citizenship only occurs upon acquisition of South 
Sudanese citizenship. At first blush this appears to exclude the possibility of de jure 
statelessness. However, while any determination with respect to such acquisition will be 
made in accordance with the acquisition criteria as set out in the South Sudanese law, the 
Sudanese law does not require a prior determination as to acquisition by the South 
Sudanese state itself. Rather, this is something to be determined by Sudan in parallel with 
any later determinations made by South Sudan with respect to the same issue. While both 
countries are tasked with determining acquisition of South Sudanese nationality they will 
not necessarily consider the same evidence, apply the same legal tests, or complete their 
determinations with the same degree of administrative efficacy. The result is that some 
individuals, denationalized by Sudan on the basis of their prima facie South Sudanese 
citizenship (as determined by the Sudanese authorities), will ultimately be rendered de 
jure stateless as they fail to establish their claims to citizenship before the new South 
Sudanese authorities. 
¶6  Moreover, even where citizenship of South Sudan is acquired, individuals outside 
their country of nationality and in need of national protection will be left as de facto 
stateless in the absence of proactive steps on the part of the South Sudanese state to 
extend protection to their nationals abroad. This is of particular significance given the 
obstacles now facing individuals seeking to return from Sudan to South Sudan. Following 
the secession of South Sudan measures were put into place to facilitate the return of 
South Sudanese nationals to Sudan.11 However, a policy of public austerity enforced by 
the shutdown of oil production in South Sudan in early 2012,12 combined with increasing 
tensions on the border between Sudan and South Sudan,13 have now largely brought the 
returns process to a halt.14 As a result, a significant number of South Sudanese nationals 
remain stranded outside their country of nationality and subject to any discretionary 
measures that might be taken by the state authorities with respect to foreign nationals. 
This may include restrictions on the right to work and reside in the state, restricted access 
to public services, and, ultimately, expulsion as a foreign national. The interaction 
between the two nationality regimes, in turn, raises an important question of 
interpretation with respect to the definition of de jure statelessness found in Article 1(1) 
of the 1954 Statelessness Convention.15 I discuss the correct interpretation of Article 1(1) 
                                                        
11
 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF MIGRATION, IOM SOUTH SUDAN ANNUAL REPORT 2012 (2012), 
http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/Country/docs/IOM_South_Sudan_Annual_%20Report_2012.p
df. 
12
 Mading Ngor & Maher Chmaytelli, South Sudan Cuts Back Oil Output, Braces for Shutdown, 
BLOOMBERG, (July 25, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-25/south-sudan-cuts-back-oil-
output-braces-for-shutdown.html.   
13
 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2013: SOUTH SUDAN (2013), http://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2013/country-chapters/south-sudan. 
14
 Harriet Martin, South Sudanese Still Struggle to Return, AL-JAZEERA, (August 30, 2013), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/08/201382992527601610.html.  
15
 “For the purpose of this Convention, the term ‘stateless person’ means a person who is not considered as 
a national by any State under the operation of its law.” Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons art. 1(1), Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 [hereinafter 1954 Statelessness Convention].  
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in sections 3(c) and 3(d) of this paper. Is the question of nationality for the purposes of 
the Article 1(1) statelessness definition to be determined on the basis of a third-party 
construction of the law or according to the views, however peculiar or arbitrary, of the 
state of presumptive nationality itself? On first reading, Article 1(1) itself may appear 
equivocal on this point. It defines a stateless person as someone “who is not considered as 
a national by any State” and this apparently preferences the subjective views of the 
state.16 However, it qualifies this with a further requirement for such consideration to be 
“under the operation of its law,” which introduces an objective element.17 I consider the 
role of both the subjective and objective elements of this definition with reference to the 
UNHCR Prato Conclusions18 on statelessness and recent case law from the U.K. on the 
application of Article 1(1). I conclude that, while the Article 1(1) definition contains both 
subjective and objective elements, it is the subjective view of the state with respect to the 
fact of acquisition that is to be given the greatest weight 
¶7  Put bluntly, national protection can only be delivered by states. Although an 
objective or third-party construction of a state’s nationality law may be significant for 
determining what protection can be offered by that state, it cannot substitute for that 
protection. It is easy to imagine a situation in which an individual is plainly entitled to 
citizenship on any reasonable construction of the domestic nationality law, yet is denied 
nationality by an autocratic state because of its own capricious reasons. An individual in 
this position is left without national protection despite what might be the best or most 
obvious interpretation of the law. To further exclude an individual in this position from 
protection under the 1954 Statelessness Convention on the basis of an interpretation of 
the nationality law which has been rejected by the state itself would defeat the most 
important policy aim of the convention, namely, to extend international protection to 
those individuals denied citizenship and the protection of a state. More prosaically, to 
privilege a third-party interpretation of the law over the subjective views of the state is 
simply to misread the Article 1(1) definition. The definition contains both subjective and 
objective tests. Consideration should be given to the views of the state together with the 
operation of its laws. Any construction of the law must be considered in the context of 
the state’s own subjective viewpoint. To apply only the objective element is to apply only 
one part of the relevant definition.   
¶8  It is important to emphasize that this reading of Article 1(1) does not serve to 
occlude the important distinction between de jure and de facto statelessness but, rather, to 
highlight its most important features. It is, of course, true that states may fail to 
effectively protect their citizens, in which case they may be left as de facto stateless. 
However, it is also true that states may seek to deny the fact of acquisition altogether. In 
this case the individual is left as de jure stateless, despite what might otherwise seem to 
be an objectively better reading of the relevant domestic law. To deny the acquisition of 
their nationality is not simply another type of protection failure but, rather, reflects the 
                                                        
16
 Id. 
17
 Id. 
18
 U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, EXPERT MEETING: THE CONCEPT OF STATELESS PERSONS 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS) (May 27-28, 2010) [hereinafter Prato 
Conclusions]. 
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state’s own view as to the application of its laws to the individual concerned and their 
“right to have rights”19 at domestic law.  
¶9  To disregard the views of the state in this regard is to disregard the law as 
interpreted and applied in that state, however arbitrary or unfair it may seem to an outside 
observer. This is to adopt a strangely impoverished view of law itself. Law is as it is 
interpreted and applied. To preference an abstract construction of the law over the law as 
actually applied in the state is to fail to consult the full range of relevant interpretive 
materials. This will include the administrative practice of the state. In some systems this 
will mean taking into account what might, to many observers, appear to be the 
disproportionate influence of the executive in determining the correct interpretation and 
implementation of its domestic laws. This is not, of course, to dismiss the possibility that 
some actions taken by the executive might in fact be illegal. However, this can only be 
determined on the basis of the administrative and constitutional law of that state taken as 
a whole.  
¶10  In section 4 I examine the rules at public international law that constrain state 
action with respect to the expulsion of foreign nationals and stateless persons with 
particular reference to the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
Traditionally, states have retained considerable discretion in the expulsion of non-
nationals. However, this discretion is now significantly constrained by requirements of 
both formal and substantive due process. Although the expulsion of foreign nationals 
traditionally lies within the “reserved domain” of state powers, their powers in this regard 
are now significantly constrained by rules of substantive and formal due process. I 
consider the sources of these constraints at public international law and in the Banjul 
Charter, paying particular attention to the jurisprudence of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. In particular, Articles 12(4) and 12(5) of the Banjul Charter 
provide important guarantees against mass and/or arbitrary expulsion. Further, any 
expulsion taken for reasons of race/ethnicity will almost certainly implicate the well-
founded rules in public international law with respect to race discrimination. The Banjul 
Charter20 in particular features extensive and specific provisions with respect to 
expulsion, with an explicit prohibition on mass expulsion for reasons of race, ethnicity, 
religion and nationality. 
¶11  This is particularly significant in the present context due to the particular structure 
of the post-secession nationality regime. As has already been noted, the denationalization 
provisions of the Sudanese law are contingent on acquisition of South Sudanese 
citizenship. The acquisition of South Sudanese citizenship, in turn, depends upon ethnic 
and familial connections to South Sudan. The result is that those denationalized by 
operation of the Sudanese law will disproportionately be persons of South Sudanese 
ethnicity. The process of substitution itself probably does not offend the norms of public 
international law with respect to race discrimination due to the long-standing state 
practice in the context of state succession. However, any subsequent measures to expel 
individuals so denationalized, insofar as this disproportionately affects individuals of 
South Sudanese ethnicity, will almost certainly amount to indirect discrimination and so 
offend the norm of non-discrimination in international law.  
                                                        
19
 HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 177-78 (1968).  
20
 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 59 [hereinafter African 
Charter]. 
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¶12  I conclude in sections 6 and 7 with a brief review of the practical situation affecting 
returns to South Sudan followed by a series of key policy recommendations to improve 
the protection environment for South Sudanese nationals in Sudan. Most urgently, this 
should include a change to the underlying citizenship regime to remove criteria for the 
acquisition of South Sudanese citizenship (and, by extension, denationalization from 
Sudanese citizenship) based on race to be replaced with criteria based on habitual 
residence in state territory. Should this prove impractical, the transition period for return 
or entry to the state of one’s citizenship should be re-opened and extended in order to 
permit those displaced by operation of the new law, and particularly new South Sudanese 
citizens remaining in Sudan, to return to their new state. No steps should be taken to 
expel or detain South Sudanese nationals in Sudan until they have been given a realistic 
practical opportunity to enter their new state. As an essential aspect of this the new South 
Sudanese state must be encouraged and assisted to provide meaningful national 
protection to their nationals stranded abroad, particularly in Sudan. 
¶13  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a vigorous campaign of advocacy should be 
undertaken to inform public officials in Sudan of the position at public international law 
with respect to the expulsion of foreigners. While the norms related to arbitrary and mass 
expulsion are now reasonably plain they are also, at present, poorly disseminated. 
Moreover, any campaign should not only make clear the constraints on state action, but 
also the discretion for state action that does exist, particularly in response to threats to 
national security and public safety. As ever, the concerns of politicians and administrators 
are practical rather than legal. In order to be effective any campaign must be prepared to 
address the legitimate concerns of policy-makers alongside those of human rights 
advocates.  
II. DENATIONALIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF STATE SECESSION  
¶14  The revised Sudanese law is particularly notable for the dramatic effects of its 
denationalization provisions. Article 10(2) of the revised Sudanese Nationality Act now 
provides that “[a] person will automatically lose his Sudanese nationality if he has 
acquired, de jure or de facto, the nationality of South Sudan.”21 This is particularly 
significant given what I have suggested elsewhere is the extraordinary breadth of the 
South Sudanese nationality provisions.22 Of particular note in this context is Article 8(1) 
of the South Sudanese Act, which provides that a person shall be considered a South 
Sudanese national by birth where, among several other grounds,23 “such a person belongs 
                                                        
21
 Sudanese Nationality Act art. 10 § 2 (1957). 
22
 Sanderson, supra note 4, at 212.   
23
 The Nationality Act, supra note 3, art. 8 reads: “(1) A person born before or after this Act has entered 
into force shall be considered a South Sudanese National by birth if such person meets any of the following 
requirements— 
(a) any Parents, grandparents or great-grandparents of such a person, on the male or female line, were born 
in South Sudan; or 
(b) such person belongs to one of the indigenous ethnic communities of South Sudan. 
(2) A person shall be considered a South Sudanese National by birth, if at the time of the coming into force 
of this Act— 
(a) he or she has been domiciled in South Sudan since 1.1.1956; or 
(b) if any of his or her parents or grandparents have been domiciled in South Sudan since 1.1.1956. 
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to one of the indigenous ethnic communities of South Sudan.”24 The striking result of 
Article 8(1)(b) is that every Dinka and Nuer25 inside or outside South Sudan will 
automatically acquire South Sudanese citizenship by operation of law.  
A.   Past Practice at International Law 
¶15  The compulsory imposition of citizenship by a foreign power is unusual.26 This 
question has previously been addressed by the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(“PCIJ”) in their advisory opinion on the Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and 
Morocco.27 It was the view of the British Government that certain nationality decrees of 
the French Government passed with respect to Tunis, and what was then the French zone 
of Morocco, imposed French nationality on British subjects resident there and, as such, 
were in violation of international law.28 Although the PCIJ recognized that the question 
of nationality was generally reserved to the domain of municipal law,29 the substantive 
question in regards to the compulsory imposition of nationality was reserved by France 
and the U.K. for later settlement by negotiation.30 As explained by Weis, 
 . . . time limits were set for the filing of applications for release 
from French nationality and for the granting of such applications. The 
manner in which the dispute was settled shows that the violation of 
international law claimed by Great Britain to have been committed by 
France by the unilateral imposition of her nationality on British nationals 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(3) A person born after the commencement of this Act shall be a South Sudanese National by birth if his or 
her father or mother was a South Sudanese National by birth or naturalization at the time of the birth of 
such a person. 
(4) A person who is or was first found in South Sudan as a deserted infant of unknown Parents shall, until 
the contrary is proved, be deemed to be a South Sudanese National by birth.’  
24
 Id. art. 8 § 1b, 7. 
25
 While the Dinka and the Nuer are the two largest ethnic groups in South Sudan, there are more than 200 
distinct ethnic groups in the country. See INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT 
SOCIETIES, ANNUAL REPORT: SOUTH SUDAN 3 (2012), 
http://www.ifrc.org/docs/Appeals/annual11/MAASS00111ar.pdf. OCHA has prepared a useful map of the 
distribution of ethnic groups in South Sudan. OCHA, Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Southern Sudan, 
REFWORLD (Dec. 24, 2009), http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4bea5d622.pdf. 
26
 It is, however, not at all uncommon for states to “impose” their citizenship automatically on individuals 
born in their territory pursuant to a general rule ius soli. See, e.g., Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside . . .” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 
§ 1. 
By operation of this amendment, all children born in the territory of the United States automatically acquire 
U.S. citizenship.  
27
 Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco on Nov. 8th, 1921, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. B) No. 4 (Feb. 7) [hereinafter Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco]. 
28
 Id.; see also WEIS, supra note 9, at 71.   
29
 Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, supra note 27, at 24; see also ALFRED M. BOLL, 
MULTIPLE NATIONALITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (2007).  
30
 Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, supra note 27, at 8.  
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was considered to be remedied by the granting of a right of option 
(repudiation) to the affected individuals.31 
¶16  In one of the very few cases on this point at the international level the party seeking 
to impose compulsory nationality felt compelled to concede an option right to individuals 
affected by the new citizenship regime. The position is rather different in the particular 
context of state succession where there is substantial state practice supporting the 
involuntary substitution of nationality following a change of sovereignty.32 Indeed, the 
International Law Commission’s (“ILC”) Draft Articles on the Nationality of Natural 
Persons in Relation to the Succession of States33 makes explicit provision for compulsory 
“renationalization” in the context of state succession, albeit only following voluntary 
acquisition of the new nationality: “[a] predecessor State may provide that persons 
concerned who, in relation to the succession of States, voluntarily acquire the nationality 
of a successor State shall lose its nationality.”34 
¶17  Typically, however, this would follow a change in sovereignty over territory where 
the individuals affected by this process are habitually resident. As Hudson explained in 
his 1951 report on nationality to the ILC,  
[i]f the effects of the cession on the nationality of the inhabitants of the 
ceded territory are regulated by treaty, such treaties usually provide that 
the nationality of the predecessor State is lost by the conferment of 
nationality by the successor State. Where the transfer of territory and the 
conferment of nationality is in accordance with international law, the 
predecessor State is obliged to recognize it. Its sovereignty has been 
replaced by that of the successor State . . .35 
¶18  The ILC Draft Articles embody exactly this presumption. Articles 5 and 8(2) note 
that, 
. . . persons concerned having their habitual residence in the territory 
affected by the succession of States are presumed to acquire the 
nationality of the successor State . . .36 
and, 
[a] successor shall not attribute its nationality to persons concerned who 
have their habitual residence in another State against the will of the 
persons concerned unless they would otherwise become stateless.37 
                                                        
31
 WEIS, supra note 9, at 75 (emphasis added). 
32
 See supra text accompanying note 9. 
33
 Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States 
with Commentaries,  Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. No. A/54/10 (Apr. 3, 1999) [hereinafter I.L.C. Draft 
Articles]. 
34
 Id. art. 10(1).  
35
 Special Rapporteur on Nationality, Including Statelessness, supra note 9, at 11.  
36
 I.L.C. Draft Articles, supra note 33, art. 5; JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2006). 
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B.   The Significance of Ethnicity in the Context of Denationalization 
¶19  The South Sudanese law is rare in relying on explicitly ethnic criteria for the 
acquisition (or, as in this case, the imposition) of citizenship.38 This is particularly 
significant in terms of protection as individuals who fall within the terms of Article 8 of 
the South Sudanese law are automatically denationalized by operation of Article 10(2) of 
the Sudanese law.39 Both articles operate automatically/ex lege without further 
intervention by the state. I have elsewhere characterized these norms as constitutive or 
performative in their effects.40 The result is something like a two-stage chemical reaction. 
The first stage produces a compound that, in turn, interacts with a pre-existing substance 
to produce a secondary chemical reaction without further or intervening action.41 As 
individuals fall within the nationality criteria in Article 8 of the South Sudanese 
nationality law they receive South Sudanese nationality by operation of that law. Their 
new status as South Sudanese nationals, in turn, interacts with Article 10(2) of the 
Sudanese law to effect their denationalization by operation of law without further or 
intervening action on the part of either state.  
¶20  By incorporating the criteria of the South Sudanese Act into the denationalization 
provisions of the Sudanese Act the Sudanese regime effectively reproduces the 
ethnic/racial bias of the South Sudanese provisions to deleterious effect. In this case, it is 
unnecessary for ethnicity to be listed as a ground of denationalization in the Sudanese Act 
itself as the discriminatory effect of the law can be surmised from its effect on individuals 
of South Sudanese ethnicity.42 As the Human Rights Committee explained in Derksen 
and Bakker v. the Netherlands with respect to Article 26 of the ICCPR43, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
37
 I.L.C. Draft Articles, supra note 33, art. 8(2). 
38
 Cf. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, Jan. 6, 1986, art. 27(b); Sierra Leone Citizenship 
(Amendment) Act art. 2(b) (2006); Malawi Citizenship Act arts. 4, 5 (1966).  
39
 Sanderson, supra note 4, at 227; see also Sudan Plans to Cancel Citizenship of Southerners, Reuters 
(July 14, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/14/ozatp-sudan-citizenship-
idAFJOE76D01E20110714. 
40
 Sanderson, supra note 4, at 218-19, 227-28.  
41
 Examples of this abound in nature.  A commonly-taught example of this is the process of carbon-
fixation, essential to the process of photosynthesis. This is the first stage of the “Calvin cycle” of 
photosynthesis. See James A. Bassham, Andrew A. Benson, & Melvin Calvin, The Path of Carbon in 
Photosynthesis, 185 J. OF BIOLOGICAL CHEMISTRY 781, 782-87 (1950).   
42
 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, art. 1, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 
13 [hereinafter CEDAW]; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, art. 1(1), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD]; African Charter, supra note 20, arts. 2, 
28; Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, General Comment No. 18: Non-Discrimination, ¶ 
7, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 26 (Nov. 10, 1989); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding the Security Council Resolution 
276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 57 (June 21); THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS ACROSS BORDERS, 
STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL POLICY, NO. 23 17-18 (Louis B. Sohn & Thomas Buergenthal eds., 
1992). 
43
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 26, December 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR] (“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all 
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”). 
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Article 26 prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination, the latter 
notion being related to a rule or measure that may be neutral on its face 
without any intent to discriminate but which nevertheless results in 
discrimination because of its exclusive or disproportionate adverse effect 
on a certain category of persons.44 
¶21  The operation of the Sudanese denationalization provisions will therefore result in a 
violation of Articles 2(1)45 and 26 of the ICCPR and the customary international law 
norm against non-discrimination with respect to race.46  
C.   Two Key Policy Goals of Habitual Residence 
¶22  Conferring citizenship in the context of state succession on the basis of habitual 
residence achieves two key policy goals. First, this effectively guarantees that individuals 
who acquire citizenship under the new regime will have a genuine or effective link with 
the relevant state. As explained by the ICJ in the Nottebohm case, 
. . . nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of 
attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, 
together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said 
to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon 
whom it is conferred, either directly by the law or as the result of an act of 
                                                        
44
 Human Rights Committee, Derksen v. Netherlands, Communication No. 976/2001, ¶ 9.3, U.N. Doc 
CCPR/C/80/D/976/2001 (June 15, 2004); Human Rights Committee, Althammer et al. v. Austria, 
Communication No. 998/2001, ¶ 10.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/998/2001 (Sept. 22, 2003); Human Rights 
Committee, Simunek et al. v. The Czech Republic, ¶ 11.7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/54/D/516/1992 (July 19, 
1995); Ahmad v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8160/78, 4 E.H.R.R. 127 (1981); D.H. v. The Czech 
Republic, App. No. 57325/00, 43 E.H.R.R. 41 (2007);13; Stedman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29107/95, 
23 E.H.R.R. 168 (1997); Zarb Adami v. Malta, App. No. 17209/02, 44 E.H.R.R. 49 (2007).  
45
 ICCPR, supra note 43, art. 2(1), (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”). 
46
 ICCPR, supra note 43, arts. 2(1), 24, 26, December 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2(1), December 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; ICERD, supra 
note 42, arts. 1(1), 2(1); Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res 44/25, art. 2, U.N. Doc A/44/49 
(Sept.  2, 1990) [hereinafter CRC]; African Charter, supra note 20, arts. 2, 3, 19. See also THE 
TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN art. 14 (2011) (“All persons are equal 
before the law and are entitled to the equal protection of the law without discrimination as to race, ethnic 
origin, colour, sex, language, religious creed, political opinion, birth, locality or social status.”).  In addition 
to conventional sources, there is now little doubt that rules against racial discrimination now form part of 
customary international law. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 
Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5); 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES §702 (1987); Report of the Independent Expert on Minority Issues: Promotion and 
Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right 
to Development, ¶ 35, UN Doc A/HRC/7/23 28 (Feb. 28, 2008) (by Gay McDougall); GUY S. GOODWIN-
GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BETWEEN STATES 85 (1978); JAMES 
CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 642 (8th ed. 2012).   
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the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population of the 
State conferring nationality that with that of any other State.47  
¶23  Although the ICJ in Nottebohm was concerned with allocating responsibility to 
states for the diplomatic protection of their nationals this is a principle of general 
application in the context of citizenship. As Rezek explains, “the judicial relationship of 
nationality should not be based on formality or artifice, but on a real connection between 
the individual and the state.”48 Habitual residence is the most frequently used test for 
assessing this connection.49  
¶24  Second, the test of habitual residence ensures that in the vast majority of cases 
individuals acquiring citizenship of a state will actually reside in that state. Individuals 
renationalized on the basis of their ethnicity to citizenship of a state of which they are not 
a resident (thereby losing the citizenship of their state of habitual residence) face the 
immediate prospect of expulsion as a foreign national to the state of their (new) 
citizenship.50 Where, as will frequently be the case, they lack a genuine or effective link 
with that state, they will face the further challenge of establishing a sustainable livelihood 
in a context where—apart from the bare of fact of their ethnicity—their language, 
religion, and profession may differ wildly from those that predominate locally. The test 
of habitual residence is an important tool by which citizenship in the context of state 
succession can be made consistent with the practical and effective associations of an 
individual with the state and allows for the orderly reconciliation of citizenship roles 
following the transfer of sovereignty over territory. In its absence, and particularly where 
individuals acquire citizenship on the basis of a purely notional connection such as 
ethnicity, individuals will struggle to reconcile the reality of their daily lives with the 
rights and duties associated with their new nationality. 
¶25  The peculiar effect of the post-secession nationality regime in Sudan and South 
Sudan has been to create a class of individuals who are, in effect, legally (if not yet 
physically) displaced. Although previously resident in Sudan as Sudanese citizens, 
individuals of South Sudanese ethnicity or with family connections to South Sudan have 
now been denationalized by operation of Article 10(2) of the Sudanese Act and, as such, 
                                                        
47
 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6); Magalhais v. 
Fernandes, 10 I.L.R. 290 (1936); German Nationality, 19 I.L.R. 319 (1952); Crawford, supra note 36, at 
516; cf. Prato Conclusions, supra note 18, ¶ 10. 
48
 José F. Rezek, Le Droit International de la Nationalite, in COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE 
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 198, 357 (1987); UNHCR Regional Bureau for Europe, The Czech and 
Slovak Citizenship Laws and the Problem of Statelessness in Citizenship, in CITIZENSHIP IN THE CONTEXT 
OF THE DISSOLUTION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA EUROPEAN (1996). 
49
 PATRICK O’CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 518 (1967). See, 
e.g., LAW ON CITIZENSHIP OF KOSOVO art. 29 (Kos.) (“All persons who on 1 January 1998 were citizens of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and on that day were habitually residing in Republic of Kosova shall be 
citizens of Republic of Kosova and shall be registered as such in the register of citizens irrespective of their 
current residence or citizenship.”) 
50
 “[H]ostile rhetoric from Sudanese government officials toward southerners, which began in the period 
leading up to the referendum, has stoked fears that large numbers of southerners will be expelled after April 
8. President Omar Al-Bashir, who began calling southerners ‘foreign’ during the referendum, has 
repeatedly vowed that Sudan’s new constitution will not provide any protections for non-Muslims or 
diversity, a threat that is widely understood in Sudan as directed against southerners.” Sudan: Don’t Strip 
Citizenship Arbitrarily, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/02/sudan-
don-t-strip-citizenship-arbitrarily. 
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excluded from the entitlements which they previously enjoyed as citizens in their place of 
habitual residence.51 
¶26  Immediately following secession the two governments agreed to a nine-month 
“transition period” to run until April 8, 2012.52 During this period, individuals with ethnic 
and familial affinities with the South were expected either to regularize their immigration 
status in Sudan as foreign nationals or to relocate to South Sudan.53 It should be 
emphasized that, although both domestic and international actors typically refer to 
“return” in this context,54 for many South Sudanese in Sudan this would be their first 
journey to the territory of South Sudan. Following the expiry of this period up to half a 
million55 South Sudanese remain effectively stranded in Sudan, despite having now lost 
their Sudanese citizenship and having few prospects for regularizing their immigration 
status in the country.56 As result, they have now lost their rights to employment and 
residence in Sudan and, in many cases, are unable to access basic services such as 
education and healthcare.57 Instead of reconciling the citizenship of habitual residents to 
the change in territorial sovereignty the new regime has served to disorder their 
citizenship. The rights of many long-term residents of Sudan are no longer effectively 
linked to their territory of residence. Individuals resident in Sudan but with connections 
to South Sudan are consequently vulnerable to two key protection threats: statelessness 
and mass expulsion. I will now consider each in turn. 
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 Sarnata Reynolds, Gaining a Nation, Losing a Nationality, REFUGEES INT’L (Jan. 17, 2012), 
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/blog/gaining-nation-losing-nationality. 
52
 Id.; see also James Copnall, Dispossessed: The South Sudanese Without a Nationality, BBC NEWS (Apr. 
6, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17624075; S.C. Res. 2046, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2046 (May 
2, 2012). 
53
 U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, SUDAN: WEEKLY HUMANITARIAN 
BULLETIN: 2–8 APRIL 2012 3 (2012), 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA%20Sudan%20Weekly%20Humanitarian%20B
ulletin%202%20-%208%20April%202012.pdf. 
54
 See, e.g., Patterns of Return and Logistical Challenges, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTRE 
(Jun. 26, 2012), http://www.internal-
displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/%28httpEnvelopes%29/905D797AC90C78CAC125796F000
21206?OpenDocument. 
55
  Copnall, supra note 52; Reynolds, supra note 51; Sudan and South Sudan Must Step Back from War, 
CARITAS INTERNATIONALIS (Apr. 24, 2012), 
http://www.caritas.org/newsroom/press_releases/PressRelease24_04_12.html. Estimates of South Sudanese 
nationals remaining in Sudan vary widely. Although the figure of 500,000 was widely reported throughout 
2011 and 2012, the figure more commonly reported in 2013 is 250,000. See, e.g., INT’L ORG. MIGRATION, 
IOM SOUTH SUDAN: 2013 COUNTRY PROGRAMME 2 (2013), 
http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/Country/docs/IOM_South_Sudan_2013_Country_Programme.
pdf.  However, given the very slow progress of returns to South Sudan, this latter number seems unduly 
optimistic. 
56
 Reynolds, supra note 51.  
57
 Id.; see also BRONWEN MANBY, THE RIGHT TO A NATIONALITY AND THE SECESSION OF SOUTH SUDAN: A 
COMMENTARY ON THE IMPACT OF THE NEW LAWS 5 (2012), 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/right-nationality-and-secession-south-sudan-
commentary-20120618.pdf. 
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III.   RESULTING DE JURE STATELESSNESS58 
¶27  The denationalization provisions of the Sudanese law operate ex lege, without a 
prior determination with respect to nationality by the South Sudanese state or the 
opportunity for either individual consideration or administrative appeal.59 In these 
circumstances there is an evident risk of statelessness resulting from the arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality, contrary to international law.60 The basic guarantee against 
arbitrary deprivation of nationality is found in Article 15(2) of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights.61 While this provision is not replicated in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights,62 there is now extensive state practice in support of this as a 
rule of customary international law.63 The avoidance of statelessness is itself a well-
founded principle of public international law. Any deprivation leading to statelessness 
will most likely be arbitrary unless it is done pursuant to a legitimate state interest and is 
proportionate to the demands of that interest.64 Given the potential impact of rendering an 
individual stateless, such a measure will be proportionate only when necessary to protect 
the most urgent state interests. 
¶28  The nationality provisions of the South Sudanese law also operate ex lege. 
Individuals with family or ethnic connections to South Sudan will acquire the nationality 
of South Sudan even in the absence of a positive administrative determination by the 
South Sudanese state. Any later administrative determinations by the South Sudanese 
state can only be declarative (descriptive or constative) in their effect. The combined 
effect of these provisions makes analyzing the position with respect to resulting 
statelessness complex. On first examination it might seem that due to the automatic/ex 
lege operation of the South Sudanese nationality provisions, and the manner in which 
they have been incorporated into the Sudanese law, anyone denationalized by operation 
of the Sudanese law must necessarily have first acquired citizenship of South Sudan. 
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 Sections 5, 6, 7, and 8 of this paper build on my more preliminary discussion of this same issue in Mike 
Sanderson, Key Threats of Statelessness in the Post-Secession Sudanese and South Sudanese Nationality 
Regimes, 19 TILBURG L. REV. 234 (2014). 
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 Sanderson, supra note 4, at 227-28. 
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 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. XV, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. 
A/810 [hereinafter UDHR]; Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, art. VIII, ¶ 1, Aug. 30, 1961, 
989 U.N.T.S. 175 [hereinafter 1961 Statelessness Convention]; U.N. Secretary-General, Annual Report of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Reports of the Office of the High 
Commissioner and the Secretary-General: Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality: Rep. of the Secretary-
General, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/34 (Jan. 26, 2009); Carol A. Batchelor, Stateless Persons: Some Gaps 
in International Protection, 7 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 232, 238; (1995); Johannes M.M. Chan, The Right to a 
Nationality as a Human Right: The Current Trend Towards Recognition, 12 HUM. RTS. L. J. 1, 8-9 (1991).  
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 UDHR, supra note 60, art. 15(2). 
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 ICCPR, supra note 43.  
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 See ICERD, supra note 42, art. 5(d)(iii); CEDAW, supra note 42, art. 9; Convention on the Nationality 
of Married Women, ¶ 16, Feb. 20, 1957, 309 U.N.T.S. 65; Human Rights Council, Thematic Study on the 
Issue of Violence Against Women and Girls and Disability, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/20/5 (July 16, 
2012); H.R.C. Res. 7/10, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/7/10 (Mar. 27, 2008); H.R.C. Res. 10/13, ¶ 2, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/RES/10/13 (Mar. 26, 2009); H.R.C. Res. 13/2, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/13/2 (Apr. 14, 
2010); U.N. Secretary-General, Human Rights and Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality: Rep. of 
the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 19-46, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/34 (Dec. 14, 2009); CRAWFORD, supra note 46, at 
522.  
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 Human Rights Council, Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 51, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/10/34 (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.refworld.org/docid/49958be22.html. 
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Insofar as the operation of the Sudanese denationalization provision is conditional upon 
the prior acquisition of South Sudanese citizenship the operation of this section appears 
to be consistent with the protections against statelessness found in Articles 5(1)65 and 
8(1)66 of the 1961 Statelessness Convention.67 In this case, the operation of the latter 
provision has been incorporated as the essential condition for the operation of the former. 
The Sudanese law does not operate to denationalize individuals who have not yet 
acquired South Sudanese nationality, and where the individual does not acquire South 
Sudanese citizenship the Sudanese denationalization provisions do not operate: expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius. This appears to eliminate any potential for resulting de jure 
statelessness. Further, and as discussed above, there is good authority in public 
international law for the involuntary substitution of nationalities following state 
succession to reflect a change in territorial sovereignty.68  
A.   Legal Tests and “Interpretive Concepts” 
¶29  However, while the two operations share a test (i.e., the acquisition of South 
Sudanese nationality), this is not to say that as a result they necessarily share the same 
criteria for the application of that test. This is particularly important in the absence of a 
requirement for a formal determination or statement confirming acquisition (regardless of 
whether this is constitutive or declarative in its effect) by the South Sudanese state. 
Although each state is free to determine the fact of acquisition it will remain unclear, in 
the absence of positive steps to extend protection to an individual so affected, whether 
their nationality will ultimately be recognized by the succeeding state. The criteria for the 
acquisition of South Sudanese nationality is complex and depends on the evaluation of 
civil evidence relating to, inter alia, family relationships,69 ethnicity,70 and continuous 
residency by a range of family members over an extended period in the territory of South 
Sudan.71 These are interpretive concepts of the type first made the subject of serious 
jurisprudential debate by the late Ronald Dworkin.72 It is mere prejudice to assume that in 
order to be meaningful or coherent any exchange concerning these tests must share 
                                                        
65
 “If the law of a Contracting State entails loss of nationality as a consequence of any change in the 
personal status of a person such as marriage, termination of marriage, legitimation, recognition or adoption, 
such loss shall be conditional upon possession or acquisition of another nationality.” 1961 Statelessness 
Convention, supra note 60, art. 5(1).  
66
 “A Contracting State shall not deprive a person of its nationality if such deprivation would render him 
stateless.” Id. art. 8(1).  
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 Id. 
68
 See supra text accompanying note 9. 
69
 The Nationality Act, supra note 3, art. 8(1)(a). 
70
 Id. art. 8(1)(b)  
71
 Id. art. 8(2). 
72
 Dworkin provides a very tidy explanation of this idea in a recently published excerpt in the New York 
Review of Books: “[w]hat is the difference between a religious attitude toward the world and a 
nonreligious attitude? That is hard to answer because ‘religion’ is an interpretive concept. That is, people 
who use the concept do not agree about precisely what it means: when they use it they are taking a stand 
about what it should mean.” Ronald Dworkin, Religion Without God, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (April 4, 2013), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/apr/04/religion-without-god/. For a clear and very 
accessible critique of some of the main features of (what Patterson terms) Dworkin’s rejection of 
“intersubjective agreement,” see DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW & TRUTH 86 (1996). 
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common linguistic criteria.73 This is what Dworkin referred to as the “semantic sting.”74 
It is futile to expect such criteria to be susceptible to anything like objective conceptual 
analysis in the absence of a shared interpretive attitude. This attitude will vary widely and 
unpredictably in accordance with the very different historical, religious and cultural 
trajectories of each state.     
B.   Two Parallel Administrative Processes  
¶30   While implementing regulations for the South Sudanese law have been 
promulgated, these remain at a comparatively high level of generality.75 No guidance is 
provided with respect to either which ethnic groups are to be classed as “indigenous” for 
the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of the South Sudanese law or how membership in a 
particular ethnic group is to be assessed.76 The regulations do provide for the use of oral 
evidence where documentary evidence is either unavailable or inadequate.77 However, it 
remains unclear what standards of admissibility will apply with respect to such evidence 
or the standards of proof that will apply in the context of determination proceedings more 
generally. This is particularly significant in the context of South Sudan where the history 
of civil disorder, mass displacement and on-going conflict in the border regions between 
Sudan and South Sudan mean that many individuals of South Sudanese extraction will 
have either lost or been unable to obtain appropriate civil documentation.78 
¶31  Although each state will purport to determine the fact of acquisition according to 
the criteria found in the South Sudanese law, the administrative processes of each state 
with respect to acquisition and denationalization remain separate and without legal effect 
for the other. The process of denationalization in Sudan will require a prior determination 
(by the same authority) as to the acquisition of South Sudanese citizenship. However, any 
determination made by the Sudanese authorities as to the acquisition of South Sudanese 
citizenship will not effect any later determinations by the South Sudanese authorities 
themselves. It remains to be seen whether the Sudanese authorities will accept any 
decisions made by the South Sudanese authorities as to the acquisition of South Sudanese 
citizenship to be determinative for the purposes of denationalization proceedings in 
Sudan.  
¶32  It can be expected that some individuals who habitually reside in Sudan will be 
determined by the Sudanese authorities to fall within the terms of the South Sudanese 
nationality provisions, and so denationalized by operation of Article 10(2) of the 
Sudanese law, only to have their subsequent application for nationality rejected by the 
South Sudanese authorities. As a result, and regardless of the view taken by the Sudanese 
authorities with respect to acquisition, they will no longer be “considered as a national by 
any State under the operation of its law”79 and so left as de jure stateless. This occurs 
regardless of any prospects they may have for re-consideration or appellate review of the 
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 Nationality Regulations (2011) (S. Sudan).  
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 Sanderson, supra note 4, at 212-215. 
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 Nationality Regulations, supra note 75, § 1(26). 
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initial administrative refusal.80 It remains correct to say that the South Sudanese 
acquisition provisions operate ex lege. In practice, however, any acquisition must be 
confirmed by the state authorities (even if this is only declarative in effect) if they are to 
be effective as a guarantee of national protection.  
¶33  It is reasonable to expect considerable delays in processing applications for 
citizenship as the nascent South Sudanese state works to increase internal administrative 
capacity. Although some delay is inevitable in any administrative process, where this 
becomes undue or disproportionate it is right to consider the process of acquisition as 
incomplete. This is regardless of what, in principle, is the ex lege operation of the South 
Sudanese acquisition provisions. The result with respect to an individual’s national 
protection is the same regardless of whether their application for citizenship (or, more 
accurately, the confirmation or recognition of their citizenship by the relevant authorities) 
has been refused outright or unduly delayed. Further, it is unaffected by the reason for 
that refusal or delay. Regardless of whether the delay is malicious or the result of 
administrative error, if the state is unwilling or unable to confirm acquisition of their 
nationality the individual remains (assuming the prior denationalization) as de jure 
stateless.  
C.   The Article 1(1) Definition 
¶34  It should be emphasized that an individual is left as de jure stateless whenever a 
state is unwilling to confirm acquisition of its nationality. This occurs regardless of 
whether this takes the form of an outright refusal or undue or disproportionate delay and 
occurs despite the ex lege operation of the relevant acquisition provisions. It might be that 
the only reasonable interpretation of the relevant provisions would grant citizenship in a 
particular case. This conclusion might, in fact, be entirely self-evident or may already 
have been adopted by a decision-maker in another state. However, regardless of any other 
determinations that may have already been made with respect to acquisition, unless the 
relevant administrative body in the responsible/granting state is willing to confirm 
acquisition of its nationality the individual is not considered as a national under operation 
of its law and therefore lacks good national protection. It is only the juridicial acts of the 
state which permit us to assess its views with any degree of certainty. This is true even 
when such confirmation can only be declarative in its effect. 
¶35  This follows from the natural reading of the definition of a stateless person found in 
Article 1(1) of the 1954 Statelessness Convention. Article 1(1) reads, “[f]or the purpose 
of this Convention, the term ‘stateless person’ means a person who is not considered as a 
national by any State under the operation of its law.”81 The “operation of its law” is an 
important element of this definition. Nevertheless, any reference to what might be the 
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 “The Article 1(1) definition employs the present tense (‘who is . . .’) and so the test is whether a person is 
considered as a national at the time the case is examined and not whether he or she might be able to acquire 
the nationality in the future.” Prato Conclusions, supra note 18, ¶ 16; U.N.H.C.R., Guidelines on 
Statelessness No. 1, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. HCR/GS/12/01 (Feb. 20, 2012) [hereinafter UNHCR Statelessness 
Guideline No. 1] (“An individual’s nationality is to be assessed as at the time of determination of eligibility 
under the 1954 Convention.  It is neither a historic nor a predictive exercise.  The question to be answered 
is whether, at the point of making an Article 1(1) determination, an individual is a national of the country or 
countries in question.”). 
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 1954 Statelessness Convention, supra note 15, art. 1(1). 
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objective facts of domestic law are qualified by the state’s own subjective views as to 
“who is not considered as a national” by that state. The Article 1(1) definition makes 
plain that the “operation of its law” is only one element of the state’s own view as to the 
nationality of the individual in question. It is, in effect, made subordinate to the 
subjective judgment of the state. Accordingly, the question of whether an individual is 
stateless (or, conversely, enjoys the nationality of a given state) cannot be determined 
according to an abstract construction of the law. It is, rather, an essentially subjective 
determination that must be judged principally from the perspective of the responsible 
state.  
¶36  It remains true, however, that Article 1(1) contains both objective and subjective 
elements. Its reference to “the operation of its law” naturally entails an evaluation of 
existing state norms (including ordinary administrative practices) in relation to 
nationality.82 It is doubtful, for example, whether a wholly discretionary grant of 
nationality, without some basis in domestic law or administrative practice, would be 
sufficient to prevent statelessness within the meaning of Article 1(1). Any such grant 
would be unlikely to provide the qualities of durability and administrative certainty 
necessary to establish good national protection. However, the subjective view of the state 
authorities with respect to the individual concerned must be accorded greater 
significance. While this is consistent with the natural meaning of Article 1(1), it also 
meets a key protection need. A purely objective construction of national law and/or 
practice with respect to nationality, regardless of how comprehensive or progressive it is, 
will be irrelevant to the protection of the individual unless it is plain that the state is 
willing to apply the same standards. The relevant inquiry in the context of de jure 
statelessness is whether the state considers the individual to have acquired their 
nationality because it is the state itself which is ultimately responsible for their protection. 
No mere operation of law, however construed, is capable of extending good national 
protection in the absence of a state that is willing to acknowledge the acquisition of its 
nationality and act accordingly. To exclude individuals from the protections of the 1954 
Statelessness Convention on the basis of an abstract construction of a domestic 
nationality law that is left unimplemented by the relevant state is to leave individuals both 
as stateless and without the status at international law designed to protect stateless 
persons.   
¶37  Intriguingly, the UNHCR Prato Conclusions present the subjective and objective 
strands of the Article 1(1) definition as alternatives rather than elements of even equal 
importance. As it explains,  
[i]f, after having examined the nationality legislation and practice of States 
with which an individual enjoys a relevant link…and/or after having 
checked as appropriate with those States – the individual concerned is not 
found to have the nationality of any of those States, then he or she should 
be considered to satisfy the definition of a stateless person in Article 1(1) . 
. .
83
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 Prato Conclusions, supra note 18, ¶ 13.    
83
 Id. ¶ 14. The UNHCR’s most recent 2012 guidance on this point, while not addressing this issue 
specifically, appears to accept that any interpretation of domestic law should be made principally with 
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¶38  Allowing any statelessness determination procedure to rely solely on an assessment 
of “the nationality legislation and practice of States” leaves individuals vulnerable to the 
capricious whims of intolerant states who may seek to exclude unpopular minorities or 
political dissidents from citizenship regardless of what might seem the ordinary meaning 
of their nationality legislation. It is easy to imagine a situation in which a third-party 
decision-maker understands the domestic law of a state to grant citizenship in a particular 
case while the state itself either stubbornly refuses to acknowledge or actively denies the 
fact of acquisition. Individuals caught in this position will be left without national 
protection regardless of what might seem the best or most obvious reading of the law. 
Moreover, the approach of the Prato Conclusions seems to reflect an obvious misreading 
of the Article 1(1) definition itself, which includes reference to both the subjective view 
of the state and the objective operation of its laws. To rely on one element to the 
exclusion or in the alternative of the other is to apply only one part of the Article 1(1) 
definition.  
¶39  It should be emphasized that this does not altogether rule out the possibility of 
executive or administrative conduct that is itself patently illegal and so illegitimate as a 
juridical act of state. There must be a point in any system where the conduct of the 
executive moves beyond what can be accepted as a legitimate expression of the state and 
descends into outright illegality. However, this can only ever be judged on the basis of 
the constitutional practice of the state taken in the round. It would certainly be wrong to 
conclude that executive and/or administrative action taken contrary to an abstract or 
third-party construction of the nationality law is necessarily illegal, if only because this 
fails to take into account the particular model or division of state powers relevant to that 
state. In part, any such conclusion will depend on domestic provision to address the abuse 
of executive or administrative power. In the absence of such provision the question of 
when state action passes from the legitimate exercise of administrative discretion, 
however capricious or eccentric, to outright illegality within the terms of the domestic 
constitutional settlement will frequently remain obscure to foreign observers. An outside 
observer should be slow to reach a conclusion of illegality where the result would be to 
leave an individual without protection as either a national or a stateless person within the 
terms of Article 1(1). To disregard all subjective or discretionary conduct that appears to 
contradict an abstract or third-party construction of the law as mere illegality would be to 
reduce the subjective element in Article 1(1) to irrelevance.  
¶40  This is also not to confuse the question of effective nationality with the effective 
acquisition of nationality.84 It is these, quite separate, questions that underpin the key 
distinction between de facto and de jure statelessness. States may, of course, seek to 
exclude individuals who have properly acquired nationality from the benefits or 
protection to which they are properly entitled. States may also, however, seek to behave 
more radically and deny the fact of acquisition at all. The two positions, while often 
blurred in state practice, can and should be distinguished in law.    
                                                                                                                                                                     
reference to (and so subordinate to) that state’s own practice. See UNHCR Statelessness Guideline No. 1, 
supra note 80, ¶ 16 (“Establishing whether an individual is not considered as a national under the operation 
of its law requires a careful analysis of how a State applies its nationality laws . . . This is a mixed question 
of fact and law.”). 
84
 Id. ¶ 3. 
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D.   The Case of B2 
¶41  Although not particular to Sudan, a very clear illustration of the failure of 
protection that can result where a decision-maker fails to give priority to the subjective 
view of the granting state when determining the fact of nationality can be found in the 
recent English case of B2 v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department.85 In this 
case, the Home Secretary sought to denationalize a UK citizen of Vietnamese extraction 
(B2) pursuant to her powers under § 40(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981.86 As the 
Home Secretary is forbidden from making an order pursuant to § 40(2) where this would 
render an individual stateless,87 the question at hand was whether B2 retained Vietnamese 
citizenship. While the position at Vietnamese law was reasonably clear, it was submitted 
on behalf of B2 that, because of the influence of the executive in the Vietnamese 
government, the ordinary or apparent laws or state practice with respect to nationality 
could not be taken as confirmation of B2’s citizenship. Indeed, Jackson LJ (writing on 
behalf of the court) conceded that “[t]he Vietnamese Government has now, apparently, 
decided to treat B2 as having lost his Vietnamese nationality.”88 Nevertheless, the court 
found that, 
[i]f the relevant facts are known and on the basis of those facts and the 
expert evidence it is clear that under the law of a foreign state an 
individual is a national of that state, then he is not de jure stateless. If the 
Government of the foreign state chooses to act contrary to its own law, it 
may render the individual de facto stateless. Our own courts, however, 
must respect the rule of law and cannot characterize the individual as de 
jure stateless.89 
¶42  B2 could, therefore, be deprived of his UK citizenship by the Home Secretary in 
compliance with the restrictions in s40(2). Although in the view of the court B2 enjoyed 
the citizenship of Vietnam, this was denied by Vietnam itself. He was thereby left 
without effective national protection from either the U.K. or Vietnam or international 
protection pursuant to the 1954 Statelessness Convention as a de jure stateless person. 
Here the court relied on its own construction of the Vietnamese statute to the exclusion of 
the view of the Vietnamese state. Regardless of whether this approach complied with the 
more general value of the “rule of law,” it failed to properly apply Article 1(1) of the 
1954 Convention. Insofar as the court preferred the objective element to the exclusion of 
the subjective element (in this case the clearly expressed view of the Vietnamese state) it 
applied only part of the Article 1(1) definition to B2’s case.    
                                                        
85
 B2 v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA (Civ) 616. This case is currently 
on appeal in the U.K. Supreme Court and a final judgment is expected sometime in 2014.  
86
 “The Secretary of State may by order deprive a person of a citizenship status if the Secretary of State is 
satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public good.” British Nationality Act, (1981) § 40(2). 
87
 “The Secretary of State may not make an order under subsection (2) if he is satisfied that the order would 
make a person stateless.” Id. § 40(4). 
88
 B2 v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2013] EWCA (Civ) 616, [91].  
89
 B2 v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2013] EWCA (Civ) 616, [92]. 
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E.   Resulting De Facto Statelessness  
¶43  It remains true that individuals with ethnic or familial affinities with South Sudan 
(regardless of their place of habitual residence, but including those resident in Sudan) will 
have acquired South Sudanese citizenship ex lege by operation of Article 8 of the South 
Sudanese nationality law. There is an important distinction to be made here between 
those cases where a state refuses or unduly delays recognition of its nationality and where 
it has not yet been asked the relevant question. In the absence of clear measures by the 
state to indicate that the individual has not, in fact, acquired South Sudanese citizenship 
(including outright rejection or an undue or disproportionate delay in confirming 
acquisition) it is correct to assume that acquisition has occurred in the expected manner. 
To assume otherwise would frustrate the process of substitution envisaged by the ILC 
Draft Articles and leave individuals falling within the nationality provisions of the South 
Sudanese law as inchoate and, following their denationalization by operation of Article 
10(2) of the Sudanese law, as de jure stateless. In addition to leaving these individuals 
without national protection this would place an almost insurmountable burden on the 
South Sudanese administration. It would be called upon to individually consider and 
process applications for citizenship made by all individuals denationalized by operation 
of the Sudanese law and who would otherwise acquire the citizenship of South Sudan ex 
lege.  
¶44  It goes without saying, however, that acquisition of a new nationality ex lege does 
not necessarily translate into good national protection. Those individuals who have been 
denationalized by operation of Article 10(2) of the Sudanese law and who remain in 
Sudan will frequently be left as de facto stateless. Regardless of their acquisition of South 
Sudanese nationality they remain outside their country of nationality and, in many cases, 
without meaningful national protection. This follows the definition of de facto stateless as 
given in the recent UNHCR Prato Conclusions, 
¶45  
. . . de facto stateless persons are persons outside the country of their 
nationality who are unable or, for valid reasons, are unwilling to avail 
themselves of the protection of that country. Protection in this sense refers 
to the right of diplomatic protection exercised by a State of nationality in 
order to remedy an internationally wrongful act against one of its 
nationals, as well as diplomatic and consular protection and assistance 
generally, including in relation to return to the State of nationality.90 
¶46  Until South Sudan is in a position to take positive steps to extend national 
protection to their nationals in Sudan (including practical assistance to facilitate their 
return), such individuals should be considered as de facto stateless within this definition. 
This serves to expose an important, if long-standing, protection gap. There is an extensive 
and well-articulated treaty regime for the protection of individuals who are de jure 
stateless as defined in Article 1(1) of the 1954 Statelessness Convention. This includes, 
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 Prato Conclusions, supra note 18, ¶ II(A)(2). 
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most notably, the 1954 and 1961 Statelessness Conventions.91 However, there is no 
particular regime for the protection of de facto stateless persons.92 Individuals left outside 
their country of nationality and in need of national protection are reliant on any 
discretionary measures that might be taken for their protection by the host state.  
F.   De Facto and De Jure Acquisition of Nationality 
¶47  It is notable that Article 10(2) of the Sudanese law refers to both de jure and de 
facto acquisition of South Sudanese nationality as conditions for denationalization. This 
is an apparently novel formula and it is important not to allow it a significance that it 
should not properly have. The reference in Article 10(2) is to the de facto acquisition of 
nationality rather than the acquisition of de facto nationality. What must be established 
for the operation of Article 10(2) is the de jure or de facto acquisition of nationality rather 
than actual or de facto state protection. Individuals acquire the nationality of South Sudan 
when they meet the criteria set out in Article 8 of the South Sudanese Act due to the ex 
lege operation of this section. The acquisition of South Sudanese nationality is, therefore, 
both de jure and de facto without further administrative measures. As a result, this 
formula adds nothing to ordinary legal/de jure acquisition. This is particularly true as this 
is phrased in the alternative (de jure or de facto) with either option apparently sufficient 
to bring the individual so affected within the operation of Article 10(2).93  
¶48  In addition to the risk of resulting de facto statelessness individuals denationalized 
by the operation of Article 10(2) of the Sudanese Act are at risk of expulsion from 
Sudanese territory as foreign nationals. The standards relating to expulsion at public 
international law are somewhat more ambiguous than those related to the prevention and 
reduction of statelessness and so a somewhat more thoroughgoing assessment of the law 
in this area is necessary in order to determine the constraints on state action.  
IV.   EXPULSION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
¶49  Once individuals are denationalized by operation of the Sudanese law they are 
eligible for expulsion as foreign nationals. It is a well-established principle of public 
international law that states have the power to expel foreign nationals as an incidence of 
their sovereignty.94 The classic position at public international law was well summarized 
by the Privy Council in A.G. (Canada) v. Cain, 
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 1954 Statelessness Convention, supra note 15; 1961 Statelessness Convention, supra note 60. 
Unfortunately, Sudan is not a signatory to either the 1954 or 1961 Conventions.   
92
 Prato Conclusions, supra note 18, ¶ II(E)(11). 
93
 Sanderson, supra note 4, at 229.  
94
 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 
651, 659 (1892); Boffolo Case (Italy v. Venezuela), 10 R.I.A.A. 528, 534 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1903); Maal 
Case (Netherlands v. Venezuela), 10 R.I.A.A. 730, 731 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1903); Paquet Case (Belgium v. 
Venezuela) 9 Reports of International Arbitral Awards 323, 325 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1903); 1 RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 206 (1987); BIN CHENG, GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 32 (2006); Ruth L. Cove, 
State Responsibility for Constructive Wrongful Expulsion of Foreign Nationals, 11 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
802, 815 (1987); GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 46, at 203; Shigeru Oda, The Individual in International Law, 
in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 469, 482 (1968); LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
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[o]ne of the rights possessed by the supreme power in every state is the 
right to refuse to permit an alien to enter that state, to annex what 
conditions it pleases to the permission to enter it, and to expel or deport 
from the state, at pleasure, even a friendly alien, especially if it considers 
his presence in the state opposed to its peace, order and good government, 
or to its social or material interests.95  
¶50  While states continue to enjoy a wide margin of discretion in such matters,96 any 
exercise of such powers is subject to general public international restrictions with respect 
to the abuse of rights,97 good faith,98 arbitrariness,99 and the treatment of aliens.100 
                                                                                                                                                                     
691 (8th ed., 1955); RICHARD PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 459 (2nd ed., 1988); Lawrence 
Preuss, International Law and Deprivation of Nationality, 23 GEO. L. J. 250, 272 (1934).  
95
 Attorney General for the Domain of Canada v. Cain, [1906] A.C. 542, 546 (Can.). 
96
 ‘“It is the prevailing view that a State has wide discretion in expelling foreigners. Certain procedural and 
substantive minimum standards, however, are guaranteed under international law.” Yeager v. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 92, 106 (1987). See also Special Rapporteur on State 
Responsibility, Fifth Rep. of the Special Rapporteur: Responsibility of the State for Injuries Caused in its 
Territory to the Person or Property of Aliens – Measures Affecting Acquired Rights and Constituent 
Elements of International Responsibility, Int’l L. Comm’n, ¶¶ 76, 77, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/125 (1960) (by F. 
V. García Amador) (“while a state has a broad discretion in exercising its right to expel aliens, its discretion 
is not absolute.”); ROBERT JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 940 (9th ed., 
1996); Rainer Arnold, Aliens, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW VOL. IV 102, 104 
(Rudolf Bernhardt, ed., 2001). 
97
 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 3, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19; 
Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 87(2), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3; The Trail Smelter Case (U.S. 
v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (1949); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 47-
48, 75, 129 (Apr. 9); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co (U.K. v. Iran), Judgment 1952 I.C.J. 93, 133 (July 22). See also 
B. O. Iluyomade, The Scope and Content of a Complaint of Abuse of Right in International Law, 16 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 47, 72 (1975) (“The decisions of some international tribunals and the practice of a number of 
states reveal that the principle of abuse of right has become accepted as part of international law and that 
states may, and often do, invoke the principle as the basis of an international claim.”); JENNINGS & WATTS, 
supra note 96, at 407 (“Such an abuse of rights occurs when a state avails itself of its right in an arbitrary 
manner in such a way as to inflict upon another state an injury which cannot be justified by a legitimate 
consideration of its own advantage.”); Michael Byers, Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, A New Age, 47 
MCGILL L.J. 389, 417-425 (2002); GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 46, at 209, 211. 
98
 “The Court observes that the principle of good faith is a well-established principle of international law. It 
is set forth in Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations; it is also embodied in Article 26 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969.  It was mentioned as early as the 
beginning of this century in the Arbitral Award of 7 September 1910 in the North Atlantic Fisheries case 
(United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. XI, p 188).  It was moreover upheld in 
several judgments of the Permanent Court of International Justice (Factory at Chorzow, Merits, Judgment 
No 13, 1928, PCIJ, Series A, No 17, p 30; Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, Order of 6 
December 1930, PCIJ, Series A, No 24, p 12 and 1932, PCIJ, Series A/B, No 46, p 167). Finally, it was 
applied by this Court as early as 1952 in the case concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of 
America in Morocco (Judgment, ICJ Reports, 1952, p 212), then in the case concerning Fisheries 
Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), (Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, ICJ Reports, 
1973, p 18), the Nuclear Tests cases (ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 268 and 473), and the case concerning Border 
and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ 
Reports, 1988, p 105).” Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. 
Nigeria), Judgment on Preliminary Objections, 1998 I.C.J. 275 (June 11); GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE “GOOD FAITH” OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES OF STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 75, 85 (2004); Sohn & Buergenthal eds., 
supra note 42, at 23.   
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 However, this basic position is now considerably constrained by the right of non-
refoulement101 as interpreted broadly in light of the complementary non-return 
obligations found in a range of key international human rights treaties.102 In the present 
context, particular note should be taken of Articles 31(1) and 31(2) (“Expulsion”) of the 
1954 Convention on the Prevention of Statelessness: 
1. The Contracting States shall not expel a stateless person lawfully in 
their territory save on grounds of national security or public order. 
2. The expulsion of such a stateless person shall be only in pursuance of a 
decision reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where 
compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, the stateless 
person shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal 
to and be represented for the purpose before competent authority or a 
person or persons specially designated by the competent authority.103 
¶51  While this article permits the expulsion of de jure stateless persons, this is confined 
to those circumstances where there is a legitimate ground of “national security” or public 
order” to justify the expulsion.104  
¶52  While Article 31(2) provides a due process guarantee, this appears to operate only 
with respect to the grounds of the expulsion and does not provide an opportunity for the 
individual to determine their status as a stateless person within the meaning of the 
convention. Indeed, it is the view of both the ILC Special Rapporteur on the Expulsion of 
Aliens and Alison Kesby (writing separately) that this section only applies to documented 
stateless persons lawfully in the territory of the state party.105 It thus leaves unprotected 
                                                                                                                                                                     
99
 “‘Arbitrariness’ is not so much something opposed to a rule of law, as something opposed to the rule of 
law.  This idea was expressed by the Court in the Asylum case, when it spoke of ‘arbitrary action’ being 
‘substituted for the rule of law.’” Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. 266, 284 (Nov. 
20).  “It is a willful disregard of due process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of 
juridical propriety.” Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States v. Italy), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. 15, 76 
(July 20). See also JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS, MASS EXPULSION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
PRACTICE 28-40 (1995); JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 96, at 940; CHENG supra note 94, at 36; 
GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 46, at 208.   
100
 Myres S. McDougal, Lung-chu Chen & Harold D. Lasswell, The Protection of Aliens from 
Discrimination and World Public Order: Responsibility of States Conjoined with Human Rights, 70 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 432 (1976); GOODWIN-GILL supra note 46, at 62. 
101
 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees arts. 32, 33, Apr. 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. 
102
 On the principle of non-refoulement and associated sources of complementary protection, see generally 
JANE MCADAM, COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW (2007); Ruma Mandal, 
Protection Mechanisms Outside of the 1951 Convention (“Complementary Protection”), in UNHCR 
LEGAL AND PROTECTION POLICY RESEARCH SERIES, PPLA/2005/02 (2005). 
103
 1954 Statelessness Convention, supra note 15, art. 31. 
104
 There is no general right of non-refoulement for stateless individuals comparable to that found in Article 
33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Cf. Mandal, supra note 102; 1954 Statelessness Convention, supra 
note 15, art. 32. 
105ALISON KESBY, THE RIGHT TO HAVE RIGHTS: CITIZENSHIP, HUMANITY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 
(2012) (“[T]he 1954 Statelessness Convention only provides protection from expulsion for a stateless 
person lawfully on the territory of a state party (subject to the exceptions of expulsion on the grounds of 
national security or public order) leaving unaddressed the plight of the unlawfully resident stateless 
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individuals either undocumented as stateless persons or unlawfully in the territory of the 
state.106    
¶53  The expulsion of aliens generally is controlled by Article 13 of the ICCPR, which 
reads: 
An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant 
may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in 
accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of 
national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons 
against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented 
for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons 
especially designated by the competent authority.107 
¶54  While Article 13 appears to refer only to the procedural requirements for an 
expulsion, the Human Rights Committee has now interpreted it to prohibit expulsions 
that are substantively arbitrary. As it explained in its General Comment 15,  
Article 13 directly regulates only the procedure and not the substantive 
grounds for expulsion. However, by allowing only those carried out ‘in 
pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law’, its purpose is 
clearly to prevent arbitrary expulsions.108 
¶55  The concept of arbitrariness remains somewhat under-defined in international law. 
However, it is clear that any determination with respect to expulsion requires the state to 
balance their own interests against that of the individual alien to see that the measures 
taken in defense of their interests are both proportionate and bear a meaningful 
relationship to the facts of the case.109 This, in turn, requires the state to determine a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
person.”); Special Rapporteur on the Expulsion of Aliens, Third Rep. on the Expulsion of Aliens 
International Law Commission Fifty-ninth Session, ¶ 86, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/581 (Apr. 19, 2007) (by 
Maurice Kamto) (“[O]nly documented stateless persons are covered. Of course, the issue of stateless 
persons residing unlawfully in the territory of the host country is sensitive, as some undocumented migrants 
may fraudulently claim that they are stateless. What is to become, however, of the genuinely stateless 
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Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA (Civ.) 1149, [50]; HENCKAERTS, supra note 99, 
at 97-99. 
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 On the right of admission and residence for stateless persons, see generally Carol Batchelor, The 1954 
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons: Implementation Within the European Union 
Member States and Recommendations for Harmonization, 22 REFUGE 31, 27-43 (2004). 
107
 ICCPR, supra note 43, art. 13. 
108
 Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, General Comment 15: The Position of Aliens 
Under the Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (Apr. 11, 1986). 
109
 GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 46, at 230 (“A considerable margin of appreciation is left to States, but it is 
a margin that has its own limits. The expelling State is required to balance its own interests against those of 
the individual. It is, therefore, obliged to take account of the alien's acquired rights or legitimate 
expectations, and to arrive at a decision which bears a reasonable relationship to the facts.”); HENCKAERTS, 
supra note 99, at 30. 
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legitimate ground for the expulsion of the alien and to present this as part of any 
proceedings to review the legality of the expulsion.110  
A.   The Duty to Give Reasons 
¶56  The evidence in support of a rule to give reasons for the expulsion relies largely on 
the rulings of arbitral tribunals.111 Both Goodwin-Gill and Plunder have suggested that 
the duty to give reasons is restricted to international proceedings and is thus owed 
principally to the state of nationality (or the state extending diplomatic protection to the 
alien concerned) rather than the alien themselves.112 In the case of Boffolo, for example, 
Umpire Ralston found that “ . . . the country exercising the power must, when occasion 
demands, state reasons of such expulsion before an international tribunal, and an 
insufficient reason or none being advanced, accept the consequences.”113   
¶57  Nevertheless, the failure by the state to present reasons for the expulsion (while not 
necessarily an independent violation of international law) may serve as evidence of 
arbitrariness in respect of the expulsion.114 Further, there is now some international 
practice in support of an independent rule requiring governments to give reasons for their 
expulsion to the affected alien.115 “Reasons of safety” was found to be an insufficiently 
precise reason for expulsion by the arbitrator in Zerman’s Case who consequently 
awarded substantial damages despite Zerman’s own notoriety and lack of any 
demonstrable pecuniary loss.116 This reasoning is echoed in the more recent judgment of 
the ICJ in the case of Ahmadou Sadio Diallo where (when discussing the requirement in 
Congolese law to produce a reasoned decision for the expulsion of a foreign national117) 
it found that, 
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Regulation, 2004 O.J. (L 158/77), art. 30; Amnesty International v. Zambia, African Commission on 
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LAW 507 (1937); GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 46, at 231; PLENDER, supra note 94, at 462. 
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[t]he decree confines itself to stating that “presence and conduct [of Mr. 
Diallo] have breached Zairean public order, especially in the economic, 
financial and monestary areas, and continue to do so.” . . . [T]his is so 
vague that it is impossible to know on the basis of which activities the 
presence of Mr. Diallo was deemed to be a threat to public order. The 
formulation used by the author of the decree therefore amounts to an 
absence of reasoning for the expulsion measure.118 
¶58  However, the obligation to give clear and specific reasons for the expulsion does 
not necessarily translate to a requirement to show “reasonable cause” for the expulsion. 
While states must not proceed in an arbitrary manner they also have the right to judge the 
demands of “ordre public” on the basis of their own national circumstances.119  
¶59  Finally, and as a matter of common sense, it is difficult to see how any expulsion 
could be done “in accordance with law” and provide for meaningful review within the 
terms of Article 13 without first making available to the subject alien reasons in support 
of the action to serve as a basis for any subsequent process of administrative appeal.120 As 
the Human Rights Committee concluded,   
[a]n alien must be given full facilities for pursuing his remedy against 
expulsion so that this right will in all the circumstances of his case be an 
effective one. The principles of article 13 relating to appeal against 
expulsion and the entitlement to review by a competent authority may 
only be departed from when “compelling reasons of national security” so 
require.121 
¶60  The duty to show reasonable cause for such expulsions is a natural corollary of the 
obligation not to exp el aliens for “ulterior and illegal” purposes.122 As such, it now seems 
well established that any expulsion of an alien must be for good reason and said reason 
must be provided to the alien prior to the act of expulsion.123  
B.   Grounds for Expulsion 
¶61  It is probably impossible at this stage to frame a comprehensive list of permissible 
grounds for expulsion.124 However, such grounds certainly include prior illegal entry,125 
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breach of conditions for entry,126 protecting public order,127 national security,128 public 
morality,129 or following a serious violation of domestic law.130 It should be noted that the 
concept of public order (ordre public), as used here, is substantially broader than simply 
the prevention of civil disorder131 and may, in some circumstances, encompass expulsions 
conducted on economic,132 political,133 or health grounds.134  
¶62  Expulsions may also offend against more general restrictions in public international 
law. While public authorities have a comparatively wide margin of appreciation in their 
control of aliens for reasons of “ordre public,” this is only true where such measures are 
exercised in good faith and not for an illegitimate ulterior motive.135 As Goodwin-Gill 
explains,  
. . . the “right” of expulsion may be exercised with the intention of 
effecting a de facto extradition, or in order to expropriate the alien’s 
property, or even for the purposes of genocide, as by mass expulsions over 
                                                                                                                                                                     
may expel aliens, it reveals sufficient congruence of State practice to support the view that the expulsion of 
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desert frontiers. In such cases the exercise of the power cannot remain 
untainted by the ulterior and illegal purpose.136     
C.   Non-Discrimination 
¶63  In particular, state discretion in relation to expulsion is constrained by general 
public international norms in relation to non-discrimination.137 As explained by the 
Human Rights Committee in relation to Article 13 of the ICCPR, “[d]iscrimination may 
not be made between different categories of aliens in the application of article 13.”138 
This position was somewhat expanded by the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination, which in their General Recommendation 30 calls upon states to, 
[e]nsure that laws concerning deportation or other forms of removal of 
non-citizens from the jurisdiction of the State party do not discriminate in 
purpose or effect among noncitizens on the basis of race, colour or ethnic 
or national origin, and that non-citizens have equal access to effective 
remedies, including the right to challenge expulsion orders, and are 
allowed effectively to pursue such remedies.139 
¶64  As long as it is done according to one of the permitted grounds and provides for 
relevant due process protections, including the provision of both a reasoned decision and 
                                                        
136
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the opportunity for meaningful administrative review, states retain a comparatively wide 
discretion in relation to the expulsion of foreign nationals. Nevertheless, states may not 
act in a way that discriminates between groups of aliens on grounds of either ethnicity or 
national origin (including former nationality).  
¶65  This is of particular importance with respect to Sudan, where Article 10(2) of the 
amended Sudanese Nationality Act operates to remove the nationality of South Sudanese 
nationals only. Any acts of expulsion taken subsequent to the implementation of this Act 
and directed against former Sudanese citizens denationalized by operation of Article 
10(2) would inevitably offend the clear prohibition at public international law on 
discriminatory conduct of this type. This is true regardless of whether any subsequent 
acts of expulsion explicitly target South Sudanese nationals or where the measures, albeit 
neutral on their face, disproportionately affect particular classes distinguished according 
to their ethnicity or national origin.140 Regardless of whether the policy in question is 
discriminatory by “purpose” or by “effect,”141 it is equally abhorrent to the public 
international norms in question.142  
D.   Expulsion under the Banjul Charter 
¶66  Of particular significance in this context are Articles 12(4) and 12(5) of the Banjul 
Charter143 (to which Sudan is a state party144), 
12(4) [a] non-national legally admitted in a territory of a State Party to the 
present Charter, may only be expelled from it by virtue of a decision taken 
in accordance with the law;  
12(5) [t]he mass expulsion of non-nationals shall be prohibited. Mass 
expulsion shall be that which is aimed at national, racial, ethnic or 
religious groups. 
¶67  Unfortunately, and despite the numerous examples of mass and discriminatory 
expulsions since the Charter entered into force in 1986,145 this Article remains 
                                                        
140
 “The Committee notes with concern that current immigration policies, in particular the present level of 
the ‘right of landing fee,’ may have discriminatory effects on persons coming from poorer countries. The 
Committee is also concerned about information that most foreigners who are removed from Canada are 
Africans or of African Descent.” Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding 
Observations by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Canada, ¶ 336, U.N. Doc. 
A/57/18 (2002); see also Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations of 
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: France, ¶ 144, U.N. Doc. A/49/18 (1994).  
141
 ICERD, supra note 42, art. 1(1). 
142
 WARWICK MCKEAN, EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 152-166 (1983); 
GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 46, at 275.  
143
 African Charter, supra note 20, art. 12(5). 
144
 List of Countries that have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights, AFRICAN UNION (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/African%20Charter%20on%20Human%20and%20Peoples%20
Rights.pdf. 
145
 NICHOLAS VAN HEAR, CONSEQUENCES OF THE FORCED MASS REPATRIATION OF MIGRANT 
COMMUNITIES: 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS [2014 
   103
surprisingly under-examined. Where cases falling under Article 12 have been considered 
by the African Commission their judgments “have been based on poor reasoning, and 
without sufficient articulation of the legal issues involved.”146 This makes it difficult to 
determine the boundaries of these norms with any degree of precision. Nevertheless, the 
general outlines of Article 12 are now reasonably plain.  
1. Article 12(4) of the Banjul Charter 
¶68  In-line with the natural meaning of Article 12(4) the African Commission has made 
clear that “while the Charter does not bar a state’s right to deport non-nationals per se, it 
does require deportations to take place in a manner consistent with the due process of 
law.”147 This requires access to judicial review to challenge any irregularities affecting 
the administrative act of expulsion.148 This might be regarded as merely a formal measure 
of protection by which the regularity of the administrative action can be assessed. 
However, in the view of the Commission, this also includes a right to be brought “before 
a court of law to answer any charge concerning their activities and stay”149 that serves to 
support the decision of the state to expel the individual concerned. So, in addition to the 
merely formal requirement of administrative review obvious from the natural wording of 
Article 12(4), the Commission appears to infer a further requirement of substantive 
review in-line with the general public international standards restricting arbitrary 
expulsion. Indeed, in the case of Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture and Others v. 
Rwanda the Commission interpreted (without further argument) Article 12(4) as an 
explicit prohibition of arbitrary expulsion.150 As a result, Article 12(4) of the Charter 
appears to guarantee access to proceedings for the judicial review of any administrative 
action taken pursuant to expulsion and to restrict any expulsions to situations where these 
meaningfully reflect the demands of legitimate state interests, such as security or public 
order. However, the Commission has not explained which state interests would support 
such expulsions or if there are any further constraints on these orders, such as a specific 
requirement of proportionality. In this respect, we are thrown back to the general 
principles of public international law already discussed.  
¶69  Almost certainly, expulsion in the absence of provision for ordinary judicial review 
of the administrative action would be arbitrary ab initio. Access to judicial review is a 
requirement to establish a reasonable (or, indeed, any) relationship between the decision 
to expel an individual and their activities in the expelling state. The Commission has 
repeatedly questioned the failure by respondent states to substantiate, or to provide an 
opportunity to the individual concerned to refute, allegations of subversion and/or 
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criminal conduct related to expulsion.151 It seems particularly telling that the Commission 
has been willing to find a violation of Article 12(4) without further argument where there 
is a violation of Article 7152 of the Charter in the context of expulsion.153 It appears to be 
the view of the Commission that, where an individual is denied access to a competent 
court in violation of Article 7, this necessarily implies a further violation of Article 12(4) 
when this occurs in the context of expulsion.  
2. Article 12(5) of the Banjul Charter 
¶70  Article 12(5) is of more specific relevance to the position of South Sudanese 
nationals in Sudan insofar as it embodies a general prohibition on mass expulsion. Here, 
mass expulsion is defined as expulsion that is “aimed at” particular “national, racial, 
ethnic or religious groups.”154 Although Article 12(5) does not define this class further in 
respect to numbers it might naturally be presumed from the use of the terms “mass” and 
“groups” that this refers to only large-scale, rather than individual, expulsions. The 
Commission has until now avoided offering their own definition for the minimum size of 
a “mass” or “group” within the meaning of Article 12(5). However, they have so far 
found violations of Article 12(5) where thousands,155 hundreds156 and, in one rather 
surprising case, only four157 individuals, were expelled. While at this stage it remains 
difficult to draw any firm conclusions with respect to the numerical requirements of a 
“mass” or a “group” within the meaning of Article 12(5), it appears that the protections in 
this article may extend to any number of individuals more than one.  
¶71  Bearing in mind the singular nature of the definition of “mass expulsion” in Article 
12(5), it might be argued that it is unnecessary to actually expel a large group of 
individuals to violate this Article. Rather, and taken most strictly, this Article might 
restrict any act of expulsion which is literally “aimed at” a particular national, racial, 
ethnic or religious group. On this meaning, any expulsion, even of only one person, might 
amount to a violation of Article 12(5) if the act of expulsion was “aimed at” (i.e., because 
of) their particular national, racial, ethnic or religious association. In this case, such an 
expulsion would be “mass” only because of its concern with the larger group, regardless 
of the practicalities of expulsion on any given occasion. 
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¶72  The Commission has addressed a related issue in the leading case of Rencontre 
Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme v. Zambia, in which the Zambian 
government sought to resist the characterization of their expulsions as being “en masse” 
on the grounds that “. . . the deportees were arrested over a two-month period of time, at 
different places, and served with deportation orders on different dates.”158 This argument 
was rejected by the Commission, which noted that,  
[i]n holding this case admissible the Commission has already established 
that none of the deportees had the opportunity to seize the Zambian courts 
to challenge their detention or deportation.159 
¶73  On the basis of the holding in Rencontre Africaine, it seems that it is unnecessary 
for the individuals concerned to be detained and/or actually expelled at the same place or 
time as long as there is a rough proximity (in this case over two months) among the state 
actions taken pursuant to expulsion. This appears to inject a further degree of flexibility 
into the Article 12(5) standard. The class in question may be anywhere in size between 
four and thousands and it is unnecessary for them to be detained, ordered, or actually 
expelled simultaneously. It seems that even a relatively small group that is detained 
and/or expelled by the state over an extended period may still attract the protections of 
Article 12(5). 
¶74  Further, it is unnecessary for the class in question to be ethnically, religiously, or 
nationally homogeneous. In Rencontre Africaine, Zambia sought to resist the application 
of Articles 2 and 12(5) on the grounds “. . . that the expulsion was not discriminatory 
because nationals of several West African countries and other foreign countries were all 
subject to the same treatment.”160 However, the Commission found that:  
[i]t is clear from the government’s own list of repatriated aliens, however, 
that after excluding nationals of Zambia’s immediate neighbours, 
Tanzania and Zaire, West Africans constitute the majority of those 
expelled.161 
¶75  It is clear that the Commission is willing to adopt an extremely flexible approach to 
the definition of a class for the purposes of Article 12(5). In this case, the class as defined 
appears to be “West Africans,” although it is unclear if this was defined in relation to the 
national, racial, or ethnic (religious seems unlikely, although not impossible) origins of 
the individuals concerned. Further, the Commission is willing to determine such a 
classification on the basis of an overall majority as, in the instant case, it eliminated 
“nationals of Zambia’s immediate neighbours” for the purposes of its own analysis.  
¶76  Finally, it is important to emphasize the absolute nature of the prohibition found in 
Article 12(5). The concept of arbitrary expulsion implies that some acts of expulsion, if 
properly related to legitimate state interests and subject to independent judicial review, 
may be acceptable. However, Article 12(5) is clear that all mass expulsions are 
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prohibited. This is true even where such expulsions purport to be for reasons of particular 
state interest, such as the preservation of good economic order. As the Commission 
explained in the case of Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme and Others v. 
Angola,  
. . . States often resort to radical measures aimed at protecting their 
nationals and their economy from non-nationals . . . such measures should 
not be taken to the detriment of the enjoyment of human rights. Mass 
expulsions of any category of persons, whether on the basis of nationality, 
religion, ethnic, racial or other considerations “constitute a special 
violation of human rights.”162 
3. The Significance of Articles 12(4) and 12(5) of the Banjul Charter 
¶77  The prohibition on mass expulsion in Article 12(5) of the Charter is of particular 
significance for South Sudanese nationals remaining in Sudan. Article 12(4) provides an 
important guarantee of due process that, in particular, requires access to the independent 
judicial review of administrative actions taken pursuant to expulsion. It may also provide 
for further, substantive, review of the reasons for that expulsion. The Commission has 
already found that this may not include economic reasons. It is likely that, in-line with the 
general public international principles in respect of non-discrimination and Article 2163 of 
the Banjul Charter itself, this also serves to bar expulsion where such actions directly or 
indirectly discriminate against individuals on grounds of ethnicity or religion. However, 
these standards remain markedly under-examined by the Commission and remain open to 
a wide range of interpretations by member states.  
¶78  In contrast, Article 12(5) embodies a clear prohibition on expulsion where this 
affects groups defined on national, racial, ethnic or religious grounds. The class of South 
Sudanese nationals at risk of expulsion from Sudan can be defined according to both 
nationality and race/ethnicity (and possibly religion as well, as predominantly non-
Muslims in contrast with the majority Arab and Muslim Republic of Sudan).164 By 
definition, individuals denationalized by operation of Article 10(2) of the Sudanese 
nationality law should fall within the criteria for nationality found in Article 8 of the 
South Sudanese law.165 They can, therefore, be distinguished on grounds of nationality. 
Further, insofar as the process of denationalization will serve to reproduce the Article 
8(1)(b) grounds for South Sudanese nationality with respect to ethnicity, any subsequent 
process of expulsion with respect to this group will indirectly discriminate against a class 
made up of individuals of predominately South Sudanese ethnicity.166 Although this in 
itself comprises a somewhat disparate group of tribes/ethnicities, it is at least as coherent 
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as the class of “West Africans” defined by the African Commission in the case of 
Rencontre Africaine.  
¶79  Further, and again in reliance on Rencontre Africaine, it seems unnecessary for a 
group to be arrested/detained, processed, or actually expelled simultaneously to attract 
the protections of Article 12(5).167 It is sufficient if this is done only roughly 
contemporaneously (in Rencontre Africaine this process lasted over a period of at least 
two months) and “aimed at” a named category such as nationality or race. Whether 
framed with respect to nationality or race, the result is an absolute prohibition on any 
large-scale expulsion of South Sudanese nationals from Sudan. Regardless of whether the 
ethnic or national basis for this expulsion is made explicit or this is done at once or as 
part of a process which extends over time, if the end result is the expulsion of individuals 
that can be defined as a class (directly or indirectly) according to criteria enumerated in 
Article 12(5), actions leading to their expulsion are prohibited by the Charter.  
¶80  While the individual expulsions of non-nationals continue to lie within the 
discretion of states, such actions are subject to the due process requirements of Article 
12(4). This requires, at a minimum, the opportunity for meaningful judicial review of the 
state action taken with respect to expulsion, almost certainly including a substantive 
review of the reasons given for the expulsion. The Commission has not yet discussed the 
range of reasons that might legitimately support expulsion of non-nationals and, as such, 
these remain somewhat open-ended. However, following the case of Union 
Interafricaine, it is now plain that economic order cannot justify expulsions.168 Nor can 
the expulsion of non-nationals be justified when such expulsions infringe upon the non-
discrimination provisions of Article 2 in the Charter.  
V.   CONCLUSION: RESULTING STATELESSNESS  
¶81  Denationalization by operation of Article 10(2) of the Sudanese Nationality Law 
creates a clear risk of both de jure and de facto statelessness. Denationalization pursuant 
to the operation of Article 10(2) of the Sudanese Act is conditional upon acquisition of 
South Sudanese nationality. In theory, this should prevent resulting statelessness. The 
acquisition provisions of the South Sudanese Act operate ex lege without further 
intervening administrative actions by the South Sudanese state. Any further 
determinations are merely declarative (rather than constitutive) of any given individual’s 
South Sudanese citizenship. In practice this means that determinations with respect to 
South Sudanese citizenship for the purposes of Article 10(2) denationalization procedures 
will inevitably be made by the Sudanese, rather than the South Sudanese, authorities. 
There is no reason to think that the judgments of the two states in this regard will 
necessarily be consistent. An individual found to be a South Sudanese national by the 
Sudanese authorities and, by consequence, denationalized by operation of Article 10(2), 
may ultimately fail in any subsequent application to the South Sudanese state to have 
their nationality recognized. They will thus be rendered de jure stateless as a result. 
¶82  Further, individuals denationalized by operation of Article 10(2) and who remain in 
Sudan may be unable (or, for valid reasons, unwilling) to obtain effective protection from 
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the South Sudanese state regardless of what might otherwise be their effective acquisition 
of South Sudanese nationality. Insofar as they are now outside their (new) country of 
nationality and lack state protection, they are rendered as de facto stateless.169 Although 
the protection of de jure stateless individuals is governed by a well-articulated 
international treaty regime, the treaty does not extend protection to the de facto stateless. 
As such, they will be reliant on more general international human rights standards 
(including norms with respect to expulsion) and the discretion of other states for their 
protection.     
¶83  In theory, the renationalization of Sudanese nationals with ethnic and family 
affinities to South Sudan should occur instantaneously. Individuals who fall within the 
nationality criteria in Article 8 of the new South Sudanese Act acquire South Sudanese 
nationality automatically and are only then denationalized by operation of Article 10(2) 
of the Sudanese Act. In practice, however, this system produces only an illusory certainty 
with respect to citizenship. It will still fall to the two states to confirm citizenship by 
making formal determinations as to the application of relevant nationality criteria and to 
issue documentation in support of this fact. While this system may work well for those 
individuals who automatically acquire South Sudanese nationality and who are actually 
resident in South Sudan it leaves individuals with familial or ethnic affinities to South 
Sudan but who remain in Sudan in a deeply vulnerable position. Their denationalization 
will precede any grant of effective state protection by South Sudan. Many will remain in 
Sudan without either the resources to travel to South Sudan or a realistic prospect of 
supporting themselves in South Sudan should they return. These individuals will remain 
for the foreseeable future without effective state protection and, as such, de facto 
stateless.    
A.   Expulsion 
¶84  While states enjoy a degree of discretion with respect to the expulsion of aliens 
there is now a considerable due process burden on states prior to initiating any process of 
expulsion. States are certainly under an obligation to give reasons for any expulsion to 
states that legitimately exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of the individual 
concerned and are most likely under an obligation to give reasons to the individuals 
themselves prior to any expulsion. Although it is not possible at this stage to compile a 
comprehensive list of reasons that support legitimate acts of expulsion, it is clear that 
states may not expel an individual arbitrarily. As in the case of denationalization, this 
requires states to meaningfully balance their own interests against those of the alien, 
checking to ensure that any process of expulsion is both proportionate and responds 
sensibly to the actual facts of the case. Certainly this rules out expulsion taken for reasons 
that are either directly or indirectly discriminatory. As a matter of good administrative 
practice and common sense this cannot be assessed without any reasons for the expulsion 
being made available to the individual in advance together with a meaningful opportunity 
to access an independent process for judicial review of the administrative conduct in 
question.  
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B.   Expulsion Under the Banjul Charter 
¶85  Of particular importance in this context are the protections against mass 
displacement found in Article 12(5) of the Banjul Charter. This article makes explicit 
what is only implicit in the general public international law standards with respect to the 
expulsion of non-nationals. Article 12(5) awaits more detailed examination by the 
African Commission. However, it is plain on the basis of their jurisprudence to date that 
the prohibition in this article with respect to expulsions “aimed at” particular ethnic and 
national groups will certainly extend to individuals of South Sudanese ethnicity and 
nationality. As such, the Sudanese government should be extremely wary of undertaking 
any process of removal/expulsion aimed at individuals denationalized by operation of 
Article 10(2) of the amended Sudanese law. It is difficult to see how any such process, 
even one that incorporated good due process standards in-line with Article 12(4) of the 
Charter and general public international law standards, could be compliant with either the 
absolute prohibition against mass expulsion found in Article 12(5) of the Charter or the 
rules against arbitrary expulsion in general public international law. Any process of 
removal will need to be conducted on an individual basis and in response to a legitimate 
state interest, such as crime control, public health or the preservation of good public 
order. As the Commission has now made plain in the case of Union Interafricaine, the 
need to preserve good economic order will not be sufficient to justify a process of 
expulsion.170      
VI.   THE PRACTICAL SITUATION FOR RETURNEES 
¶86  For those residents in South Sudan of identifiably South Sudanese ethnicity the 
process of renationalization has worked roughly as it should. Their citizenship now 
correlates with their place of habitual residence and state of effective nationality. 
However, for individuals with familial and/or ethnic affinities with South Sudan and who 
remain outside of the country, the expiry of this period has left them in a position of 
extreme vulnerability. Up to 500,000 individuals of South Sudanese ethnicity remain in 
Sudan now as foreign nationals and, in many cases, as de facto stateless.171 Those who 
remain in Sudan have been subject to a range of discriminatory measures. Some have 
now lost their jobs and homes and, as a result, are now unable to access basic public 
services such as schools and health clinics.172   
¶87  Even for those individuals with good prospects for protection and support in South 
Sudan the collapse of the return process has left many stranded either inside Sudan or at 
key transit points just across the South Sudanese border.173 International funding for 
returns was exhausted by February 2012 and, as of March 2013, there is still no further 
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funding available for large-scale returns.174 While some small-scale convoys continue to 
return to the South from Sudan, approximately 40,000 people remain stranded at return 
points around Khartoum.175 According to the OCHA office in Sudan, “[t]hese points have 
basically become squatter camps and the people are living in squalor.”176 During a recent 
assessment mission OCHA officials found, 
. . . thousands of residents living in precarious conditions with limited 
food, water, healthcare and sanitation. Shanties made of plastic sheeting, 
wood and scavenged materials provide them with little protection from the 
elements, particularly during the rainy season. With no sanitation 
facilities, defecation in the open is common, which poses huge health risks 
especially when flooding occurs.177  
¶88  In practice, opportunities for return remain extremely limited, even for those with 
the financial means to access public transport. Return movements by rail and barge were 
organized between 2011 and 2012 by both governments, as well as some non-
governmental and inter-governmental organizations. However, trains between the two 
states are restricted to one track and have been repeatedly attacked as they pass through 
the Misserya areas in the border state of South Kordofan.178 In April 2012 a group of 
returnees was caught in the cross-fire of a conflict between the SPLA and Sudanese army 
in the Heglig area of South Kordofan as the two sides battled for control of the extensive 
oil fields in the area.179 Although key humanitarian actors have urged the two 
governments to establish corridors for safe return, on-going border conflicts continue to 
threaten key transit points between the two states.180 The situation has now been further 
complicated by the escalation of the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in South Kordofan in autumn 2012.181 Travel 
through this region for returnees to South Sudan is now effectively prevented by the 
escalation in the conflict. One of the very few remaining routes for travel from Sudan to 
South Sudan is via barge to Juba from the border town of Renk. However, Port Renk was 
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closed throughout the first quarter of 2013 due to a tax dispute with local authorities.182 
This, together with the pressures affecting other key departure points, has contributed to a 
considerable bottleneck at the port. Return with luggage via barge to Juba from Port Renk 
now costs upwards of $1000 (USD) for those seeking to fund their return from their own 
means.183 
¶89  Return via barge is complicated by the journey time between Renk and Juba 
(approximately two weeks184) and what is often the considerable quantity of luggage 
brought to Renk by returnees. Individuals seeking return to South Sudan now reach Renk 
with, on average, one ton of luggage.185 Despite the difficulties this presents for onward 
travel to South Sudan, returnees are hesitant to sell their goods for the sharply reduced 
prices they would receive in Sudan. Without guarantees of financial support or 
employment upon their return to South Sudan there is no guarantee that they will be able 
to replace their goods upon establishing themselves in South Sudan. Given the 
considerable sunk costs represented by these goods, many returnees feel that this is the 
most practical strategy for their long-term economic sustainability despite the short-term 
challenge this presents for their prospects of return.186 On June 30, 2013, a convoy of 
river barges organized by IOM left Renk for Juba carrying 950 returnees. However, this 
was the first river movement to leave for South Sudan in 2013.187 Approximately 20,000 
returnees remain stranded in one of the four transit/returnee camps around Renk.188  
¶90  In these circumstances it is patently unrealistic to expect individuals to have either 
established themselves in their new countries of citizenship or to have regularized their 
immigration status in displacement prior to the expiry of the transition period on April 8, 
2012.189 This is particularly true given the automatic operation of both the South 
Sudanese nationality law and the Sudanese denationalization provisions. Insofar as these 
both operate ex lege, they do so without further administrative procedures and, virtually 
by definition, in the absence of documentation for these changes available to either 
decision-makers on either side of the border or the individuals themselves. The result is 
two-fold: first, the continuing practical uncertainty in relation to the application of these 
laws (and the manner and degree of their enforcement), and; second, the extreme 
vulnerability of those denationalized by operation of this regime and, in consequence, 
now made either de jure or de facto stateless and at risk of expulsion as foreign nationals 
from their country of prior habitual residence.  
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VII.   NEXT STEPS: ELIMINATION OF RACIAL CRITERIA  
¶91  As a first step, close consideration must be given to the wholesale removal of the 
Article 8(1)(b) ethnicity criteria for South Sudanese nationality.190 Any use of 
racial/ethnic grounds in the determination of nationality privileges some racial groups 
above others with consequent damage to the dignity of those affected (both those who are 
privileged purely on the basis of their biological heritage and those who are excluded 
from preferment on the same grounds). Moreover, Article 10(2) of the Sudanese law 
operates to reproduce the same racial bias in the process of denationalization to the clear 
practical detriment of those ethnicities referred to in Article 8(1)(b) and in violation of the 
well-founded rules against racial/ethnic discrimination at public international law. Article 
8(1)(b) should be replaced by a criterion that reflects the practical links attendant to 
effective nationality. The best and most commonly used test for this is habitual residence 
in the territory of the new state.191  
A.   Support for Returns 
¶92  In the absence of a thoroughgoing re-assessment of the post-secession nationality 
regime in Sudan and South Sudan there are three practical steps that should be taken 
immediately to improve protection for individuals denationalized and displaced by this 
regime. These follow three distinct themes: support for returns, outreach to nationals 
abroad and advocacy in protection of individual rights.  
¶93  First, the “transition period” should be re-opened and maintained for as long as is 
required to effect the repatriation of the overwhelming majority of those currently outside 
the country of their nationality. This must include, at a minimum, substantive financial 
support on the part of both governments and the international community to subsidize 
return movements between the two states. This should also include support for 
individuals to return with a reasonable (although not, of course, unlimited) amount of 
luggage.192 Returnees must not be compelled to sacrifice their long-term economic well-
being by selling off their possessions at fire-sale prices for the opportunity to return 
home. Given the continuing conflicts on the borders between the two states, establishing 
safe corridors for return will be an essential step in any returns process.   
B.   Outreach to Nationals Abroad 
¶94  Second, aggressive steps must be taken by both Sudan and South Sudan to reach 
their nationals abroad and deliver administrative confirmation of their nationality. This 
will be particularly important for individuals formerly habitually resident in Sudan who 
have now been renationalized to South Sudanese citizenship by operation of the post-
secession nationality regime. Where relevant, and particularly where individuals lack 
formal national or identity documentation, this may involve enhanced fact-finding 
procedures, including taking oral evidence from affected individuals and their family-
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members with respect to their connections with the state.193 This will serve to minimize 
uncertainty and facilitate social reintegration for individuals repatriating to their new 
country of nationality. 
¶95  There will inevitably be cases where the two states continue to disagree as to the 
citizenship of select individuals, either where each state attributes responsibility for 
citizenship to the other state or is unwilling to make a formal determination with respect 
to citizenship due to lack of evidence. These cases should be processed through an 
independent tribunal empowered to take oral evidence and make determinations with 
respect to the credibility of such evidence in accordance with clearly stated standards of 
proof.194 This is particularly important where processing has been suspended due to 
continuing uncertainty with respect to the history and/or ethnic background of the 
individual. 
¶96  The introduction of a quasi-judicial/tribunal process will necessarily result in some 
applications for citizenship being rejected outright. However, this is much preferable than 
simply letting cases drift indefinitely for lack of evidence. Individuals so rejected may 
then rely on the formal legal rejection of their application for citizenship to seek 
protection from the other state. Where an individual’s application for the confirmation of 
their South Sudanese citizenship is finally rejected by the South Sudanese authorities, this 
should serve as good evidence that they have failed to acquire South Sudanese citizenship 
“de jure or de facto” for the purposes of Article 10(2) of the Sudanese law. Properly 
understood, this is simply a question of fact to be proved like any other element of 
foreign law.195 As such, the Article 10(2) denationalization procedures will no longer be 
relevant to them and they should continue to retain their citizenship of Sudan.  
¶97  In extremis, individuals denied citizenship by both states, but who obtain legal 
confirmation of this fact, may then seek to rely on the protections relevant for the de jure 
stateless. With such cases in mind, careful consideration should be given by both the 
South Sudanese and Sudanese governments to the introduction of a general ius soli right 
to citizenship for those children born within the territory of either state to parents who 
themselves are either stateless or are unable, for whatever reason, to pass on their 
citizenship.196 This will prevent parents from passing on their statelessness to their 
children and thereby creating a cycle of hereditary statelessness.197  
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¶98  It is likely that some individuals who are habitually resident in Sudan but have been 
renationalized to South Sudanese citizenship will be unwilling to relocate to South 
Sudan. Particularly for those individuals very long resident in Sudan, relocation to South 
Sudan may mean giving up long-standing economic and social links that they regard as 
key to their prosperity and overall well-being. Some individuals, particularly those born 
in Sudan, may continue to feel a sincere loyalty to the Sudanese state regardless of other 
ethnic or familial affinities they may have with the new state of South Sudan. For these 
individuals, some of whom will also be de facto stateless, the most anxious consideration 
should be given to regularizing their immigration status in Sudan before the expiry of any 
renewed transition period.198 
C.   Advocacy in Protection of Individual Rights 
¶99  Finally, foreign states and relevant international and inter-governmental 
organizations should be encouraged to undertake a vigorous campaign of advocacy with 
respect to the prevention of both statelessness and mass expulsion in accordance with the 
principles discussed above. Already, the Governor of the White Nile State199 has 
unilaterally ordered the expulsion of some 12,000 ethnic South Sudanese awaiting 
repatriation to South Sudan.200 Although IOM intervened to airlift this group to Juba, it is 
unclear what measures would otherwise have been taken by the state government to 
effect their expulsion.201 The temptation to initiate such acts will only grow as conflicts 
along the border between the two states continue and the results of the post-secession 
nationality settlement reify in the minds of decision-makers. There is a clear risk that 
communities on the border and/or displaced awaiting repatriation to their state of 
nationality will come to be seen as a security risk and/or a hindrance to on-going military 
operations.202 Steps must be taken now to introduce decision-makers to the powers they 
do have to remove foreign nationals that pose a threat to public order or security, the key 
due process protections that accompany any use of these powers, and the absolute 
prohibition against mass expulsion found in Article 12(5) of the Banjul Charter. Once a 
process of mass expulsion begins it is likely to be too late.  
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